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EDITORIAL
In 2006 the economic situation brightened 
substantially. GDP grew by 2.6% last year, up 
from 1.4% in the year before. This is the best 
performance since 2000 and clearly above 
potential growth which means that the output 
gap has improved significantly. In the last 
quarter of 2006, growth was balanced, driven by 
both domestic and external demand. Reflecting 
the positive growth momentum, the 
unemployment rate continued to edge down, 
falling to 7.4% in January 2007, the lowest level 
since 1993.   
Business and consumer confidence remain at 
very high levels and forecasts for this year are 
positive. According to the Commission's 
interim forecasts, the euro-area economy should 
continue to grow robustly at 2.4% over 2007. 
But in the longer run, prospects could diminish 
due to some looming risks in the external 
environment. These include more sluggish 
growth in the USA, unfavourable exchange rate 
developments, potentially high and volatile oil 
prices and a disorderly unwinding of global 
imbalances.  Moreover, the recent equity market 
turbulence is indicative of heightened financial 
market uncertainties. It is too early to tell 
whether this reflects a mere technical correction 
or the beginning of a more sustained period of 
weakness.  
Euro-area Member States have not sat still 
during the past few years. Since the launch of 
the Lisbon strategy, more progress has been 
made with structural reform than is generally 
thought. In most euro-area countries the 
average tax wedge on labour has fallen and 
many countries have taken measures in the field 
of benefit systems in order to 'make work pay.' 
Eight euro-area countries introduced reforms to 
their public pension systems and many 
countries tightened early-retirement schemes. 
Many product markets have become 
considerably more competitive over the last five 
years, due inter alia to the liberalisation of 
network industries, the effects of competition 
policy and measures to make public 
interventions more efficient. Finally, a host of 
initiatives have been launched to foster research 
and the diffusion of new technologies. 
As a result, the euro area has clearly regained 
strength. Part of the recent fall in the 
unemployment rate is cyclical in nature, but 
according to econometric estimates the 
structural rate of unemployment has come 
down as well. This is mirrored by the euro-
area's employment growth, which accelerated to 
1.4% in 2006 and yielded an increase of close to 
2 million new jobs. Since the introduction of 
the euro more than 12 million jobs have been 
created in the euro area, more than in the US 
over the same period. These positive 
developments suggest that earlier labour market 
reforms are bearing fruit. Moreover, pension 
reforms coupled with changes to early 
retirement rules have already increased 
significantly the employment rate of older 
workers and have raised the effective retirement 
age by one year. Finally, there is a rebound in 
labour productivity growth and several factors 
suggest that this could be more than just a 
cyclical rebound. These are all tangible 
indications that the structural reforms 
undertaken in the last few years have started to 
pay off.  
But it is important that we take advantage of 
favourable cyclical conditions to make further 
progress with structural reforms. These reforms 
are essential for all EU countries in order to 
raise their growth and job potential. But there is 
an extra dimension for euro-area countries. The 
single monetary policy has clearly contributed 
to macroeconomic stability in the euro area, but 
also requires the participating countries to 
adjust to country-specific economic shocks and 
competitiveness pressures without the help of 
national interest or exchange rate policies. This 
process does not yet function optimally, as is 
illustrated by the persistence of growth and 
inflation differences within the euro area and of 
current account imbalances in some Member 
States. It is true that the euro-area Member 
States' business cycles have become more 
aligned since the 1990s, reflecting inter alia 
increasing trade and financial integration, a 
common monetary policy and better fiscal 
policy. However, although growth differences 
have become somewhat smaller in 2006, they 
remain entrenched, indicating that the 
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adjustment to asymmetric shocks is slow and 
must be improved.  
Against this background, it is important that 
Member States make further progress with 
reforms that increase the adjustment capacity of 
the euro area.  
Firstly, it is important that Member States make 
full use of the favourable cyclical situation to 
speed up budgetary consolidation. It is only 
when countries have accomplished their 
medium-term objectives that they can weather 
any future cyclical downswing without 
exceeding the 3% reference value.  
Secondly, improving the quality of public 
finances by reviewing public expenditures and 
taxation, with a view to enhancing productivity 
and innovation, can contribute to economic 
growth and fiscal sustainability.  
Thirdly, more competition, especially in 
services, and integration and competition in 
financial retail services would improve the euro-
area's adjustment capacity. Prices still adjust too 
slowly to changes in national cyclical conditions. 
In the services sector, prices are particularly 
rigid, not least because of a low level of 
competition. Greater financial integration 
would further smooth the impact of economic 
shocks on incomes and national credit markets.  
Fourthly and finally, improving flexibility and 
security on labour markets could support the 
adjustment process, inter alia by better aligning 
wage and productivity developments, better 
balancing employment protection and security 
in the market and enacting measures to 
promote labour mobility across borders and 
between occupations.  
Accordingly, these issues form the four 
recommendations addressed to the euro-area 
Member States in the 2007 update of the 
Integrated Guidelines, which was endorsed by 
the European Council during its meeting on 
8 and 9 March.  This Quarterly Report explains 
the rationale behind the four policy 
recommendations.  
 
 
 
Klaus REGLING  
DIRECTOR GENERAL 
 
 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 5 - 
I. Economic situation in the euro area 
The latest reading of the national accounts for the euro area shows that the strong GDP growth in the fourth quarter rounded 
off the remarkable growth performance for 2006. For the year as a whole, GDP grew by 2.6%, up from 1.4% in the year 
before. This was the best performance since 2000 and clearly above potential growth. As a result, the economy has registered 
its first significant improvement in the output gap since the beginning of the decade. In the last quarter of 2006, growth was 
balanced, driven by both domestic and external demand. Business and consumer confidence remain at a very high levels. Some 
easing is foreseen in the manufacturing sector in the coming months but growth will continue to be supported by strong 
momentum in the services sector. According to the Commission Services' February Interim Forecast, GDP growth should 
continue at a robust pace of about 2½% in 2007.  
An inverted yield curve in the US and an almost flat curve in the euro area have drawn attention to the historical 
relationship between the yield curve and economic growth. In particular for the US, an inversion of the yield curve has been a 
"safe bet" predictor of an upcoming recession. This traditional relationship has now come into question, in both the US and 
the euro area. The main reasons for a possible structural break of the relationship are the exceptionally low level of bond 
yields, excess liquidity, the high credibility of monetary policy and the still low levels of policy interest rates compared to long-
term or neutral levels. It may even be that a flat yield curve could be stimulating economic growth under the current 
circumstances of tightening monetary policy. 
The last part of this chapter presents an economic analysis of the four policy recommendations addressed to the euro area as 
part of the 2007 Integrated Guidelines, which were endorsed by the European Council of 8 and 9 March. These 
recommendations include: (i) strengthening budgetary consolidation in good times; (ii) enhancing the quality of public finances; 
(iii) fostering competition, especially in services and; (iv) improving flexibility and security on labour markets.  
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Strong growth in the last quarter of 2006 
The economic situation in the euro area 
brightened substantially in 2006. After a slight 
deceleration in the third quarter of 2006 (0.6%), 
euro-area GDP accelerated to a very healthy 
0.9% q-o-q in the last quarter, a significantly 
better outturn than projected in the Commission 
services' Autumn 2006 Forecasts (0.6%). At the 
same time, real GDP growth in the third quarter 
was revised upwards to 0.6%. For the year as a 
whole, GDP grew by 2.6%, up from 1.4% the 
year before. This was the best performance since 
2000 and clearly above potential growth. As a 
result, the economy registered its first significant 
improvement in the output gap since the 
beginning of the decade.  
Growth in the fourth quarter was broad-based 
across most euro-area countries. GDP growth 
was very buoyant in Germany, Italy and Spain 
(0.9%, 1.1% and 1.2% respectively). In France, 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 22 March 2007. 
after a flat reading in the third quarter of 2006, 
growth rebounded to 0.6%.  
Domestic demand driven by robust 
investment growth 
As in previous quarters, domestic demand 
(excluding inventories) continued to fuel 
economic growth in the last quarter of 2006, 
accelerating slightly to 0.7%, compared to 0.6% 
in the previous quarter. It was primarily driven by 
a surge in investment spending. Gross fixed 
capital formation accelerated to a strong 1.2%, 
up from 0.6% in the third quarter. For the year as 
a whole, investment showed a robust growth 
momentum with a y-o-y growth of 4.5%. 
The breakdown of investment spending by 
sector is not yet available for the last quarter of 
2006. However, there is indirect evidence that 
growth in investment was underpinned in part by 
robust expansion in construction investment. 
Value added in the construction sector, which is 
generally closely linked to spending in 
construction, accelerated to 1.4% in the last 
quarter of 2006, compared to 1.1% in the 
previous quarter. Favourable weather conditions  
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in the last quarter of 2006 probably played a 
positive role. Combining data on total 
investment with estimates of construction 
spending suggests that equipment investment 
(which accounts for half of total investment) also 
grew healthily in the fourth quarter (about 1%). 
Graph 1: Contributions to real GDP growth, euro area 
(q-o-q % point contributions) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Fourth quarter GDP data features a very strong 
export growth performance (+3.7% q-o-q) which 
seems to have taken manufacturers as well as 
economists by surprise. The surge in exports was 
met as much by a strong inventory draw-down as 
by additional production, particularly in 
Germany. This strong reduction in inventories 
had a clear downward effect on growth. 
Including changes in inventories, domestic 
demand increased by only 0.1%. After such a 
large draw-down, a strong positive contribution 
by the inventories can be expected in the first 
quarter of 2007 as manufacturers replenish their 
stocks.  
Private consumption continued to expand at a 
relatively solid pace. It increased by 0.6% in the 
fourth quarter of 2006 and data for the third 
quarter was revised upwards to 0.7%. 
Graph 2: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 to Feb 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Household spending is clearly being fostered by 
an improving outlook for the labour market. 
Employment in the euro area increased by 
0.3%(quarter-on-quarter) in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2006. For the year as a whole,  
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1)  2006 Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006 
Q4 
Carryover 
to 2007 
2006 (2) 2007 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.2 2.6 2.1 
Private consumption 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.8 2.0 1.6 
Government consumption 1.4 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.7 2.0 1.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.8 2.1 0.6 1.2 1.7 4.3 3.0 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.0 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.4 
Exports of goods and services 3.1 0.9 1.8 3.7 3.9 7.9 6.0 
Imports of goods and services 2.3 0.8 2.2 1.9 2.7 7.5 5.7 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.1 0.9 
Government consumption 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.6 
Changes in inventories -0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 
Net exports 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.2 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Autumn 2006 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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employment increased by 1.4%, the highest rate 
since 2001. 
In line with these developments, consumer 
confidence picked up in February, reaching high 
levels last observed in 2001, while households' 
future employment expectations are reaching 
levels last achieved in April 2001 (Graph 2).  
The continuous improvements in the labour 
market combined with a possible modest rise in 
wages and lower energy prices should translate 
into a further increase in households' purchasing 
power and consumption in the first quarters of 
2007.  
A strong contribution from net trade  
Net trade, and particularly strong export growth 
was the main contributor to euro-area growth in 
the last quarter of 2006. Euro-area exports 
increased sharply (3.7% q-o-q) as a result of a 
strong increase in extra-euro-area exports. This 
increase in export growth was broad-based 
across euro-area countries. In Germany, exports 
grew at a spectacular rate of 6%, up from the 
already high 4.5% in the third quarter. At the 
same time, imports in the euro area rose by 1.9%, 
compared to 2.2% in the third quarter.  
Euro-area trade clearly continued to benefit from 
buoyant world trade. According to the latest 
estimates of the CPB Netherlands Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis, world trade increased 
by 10.1% (q-o-q annualised) in the last quarter of 
2006, marginally down from 10.7% in the third 
quarter. Emerging economies remained the most 
dynamic region. Trade developments in these 
countries offset the sluggish trade performances 
of the US and Japan.  
Graph 3: Exports and real effective exchange rate, euro 
area (monthly data Jan 2001 to Oct 2006) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In 2007, the US economy is expected to grow at 
an annual rate of 2.3%, compared to 3.3% in 
2006, as the slowdown in the housing market 
dampens consumer spending. Nevertheless, 
global economic growth should remain solid and 
world trade should keep expanding at a robust 
pace, though likely somewhat less rapidly than in 
2006. Indeed, most recent survey indicators of 
the world economy continue to point to a period 
of strong momentum over the coming months, 
suggesting that the moderation of global 
economic activity should remain limited in the 
short term. The January reading of the quarterly 
World Economic Survey indicates an 
improvement of expectations for the next six 
months, after a couple of quarters of declining 
expectations. In line with this, the February 
Global Manufacturing PMI pointed to a recovery 
Table 2: Real GDP growth, euro area  
(Interim Forecast February 2007) 
 
Quarterly GDP forecast 
(%, quarter-on-quarter)  
Annual GDP forecast 
(%, year-on-year) 2007 
 2007/1 2007/2 2007/3 2007/4 Interim forecast (February 2007) 
Autumn 
forecast  
(Nov. 2006) 
Germany -0.5 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.8 1.2 
Spain 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 3.7 3.4 
France 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 2.2 2.3 
Italy 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.0 1.4 
Euro area 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6 2.4 2.1 
Source: Commission services. 
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in global manufacturing from the downward 
trend observed since mid-2006. Moreover, 
according to the European Commission's 
manufacturing survey, export prospects for euro-
area manufacturers remain close to their all-time 
record highs. 
Inflation remains moderate 
According to Eurostat's latest flash estimate, 
euro-area HICP inflation remained stable at 1.8% 
year-on-year in February. These figures are below 
the expected inflation data for the beginning of 
2007.2 This can be attributed to the VAT hike in 
Germany having a weaker impact than expected 
and to lower than expected energy prices. Core 
inflation, however, rose from 1.8% to 1.9% in 
February due to the VAT hike.  
Graph 4: Contributions to headline inflation  
(y-o-y changes in % - Jan 2006 to Jan 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Energy price, which had been an important 
source of price pressures during the first half of 
last year have lost steam. At the beginning of 
2006, the direct contribution of energy inflation 
to headline was about 1 percentage point 
(Graph 4). Since September 2006, the 
contribution has declined substantially to reach 
less than 0.1 percentage points in January 2007. 
This developments mirror a fall in the price of 
the barrel of Brent from an average of USD 70 in 
January 2006 to USD 54.6 in January 2007 
(Graph 5). In addition, the fact that core inflation 
remained quite stable at around 1.5% in 2006 
                                                     
2 The European Commission's Autumn 2006 Forecast 
predicted HICP inflation of 2.4% in the first quarter of 
2007.  
suggests that second-round effects from past 
energy price hikes have been and are likely to 
remain limited.  
Graph 5: Oil price developments 
(1 Jan 2001 to 08 Mar 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The services sector is now the main contributor 
to inflation, with a persistently large contribution 
of 0.9 percentage point to headline inflation. 
Since mid-2006, due to adverse weather 
conditions, the contribution of unprocessed food 
has been increasing, partly offsetting the lower 
impact of energy. The two remaining categories, 
processed food and non-energy industrial goods, 
have only had a small impact on inflation 
developments.  
Turning to price expectations, evidence from 
manufacturing and household surveys is 
consistent with benign inflation developments in 
the months ahead. Industrial managers expect 
stable price pressures in the coming months 
while consumers even anticipate an easing of 
inflation over the next year.  
Despite favourable labour market developments, 
wage growth has so far remained moderate.3 The 
various labour costs indicators show continued 
moderation in the third quarter of 2006 (last 
available data). Looking ahead, the Commission's 
Autumn 2006 Forecast predicts a slight 
acceleration of wages due to new wage 
agreements being implemented in selected 
countries. These moderate upward pressures will 
                                                     
3  See the focus section on 'Contribution of labour cost 
developments to price stability and competitiveness 
adjustment in the euro area' in this issue for a detailed 
discussion.  
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not materialise before next year, however, with 
wage growth increasing from 2.2% in 2007 to 
2.5% in 2008. Unit labour costs remained stable 
at 0.8% in the third quarter of 2006, suggesting 
that inflationary pressures stemming from the 
labour market remain subdued. 
Business confidence remains strong 
Manufacturing confidence indicators remain 
remarkably high. After a decline in January, the 
European Commission's Business Climate 
Indicator for the euro area rebounded in 
February, reaching record highs once again 
(Graph 6). This was the result of a more 
optimistic assessment of past production trends 
and order books. However, managers' 
production expectations weakened somewhat. 
The Reuters PMI index for manufacturing 
activity slightly increased in February (from 55.5 
to 55.6) after a one-point decrease in January.  
While industrial production growth was nearly 
flat in October and November 2006, it sharply 
accelerated in December (1.2% m-o-m), 
suggesting that the underlying trend remains 
strong. The latest Eurostat press release shows, 
however, that industrial production in January 
decreased by 0.2%. This lower-than-expected 
figure should be interpreted with caution since it 
may reflect some seasonal-adjustment problems, 
and also masks large differences between 
Member States. Industrial production contracted 
strongly in Italy and the Netherlands (-1.4% and 
-4.3% month-on-month respectively). However, 
it increased strongly in Germany (1.7%) which is 
in line with the large contraction in inventories 
observed in that country in the last quarter of 
2006.   
 
Graph 6: Business confidence indicators, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 to Feb 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Table 3: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2005-2006 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.9 0.00 2.77 52.6 54.8 96.6   -7.8 27.9 
Trough in latest 
downturn 88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
February 2006 102.8 0.5 4.4        54.5         58.2  104.8 1.6 69.8 
March 2006 103.5 0.8 4.5        56.1         58.2  105.6 0.3 63.4 
April 2006 106.0 1.1 4.8        56.7         58.3  105.4 6.4 62.7 
May 2006 107.0 1.0 4.8        57.0         58.7  103.9 1.4 50.0 
June 2006  107.4  1.4 4.2 57.7      60.7 104.1 10.6 37.8 
July 2006 108.3 1.3 3.4 57.4 57.9 102.6 5.6 15.1 
August 2006 107.4 1.2 3.0 56.6 57.4 101.4 3.3 -5.6 
September 2006 108.9 1.4 2.5 56.6 56.7 98.9 5.0 -22.2 
October 2006 110.0 1.4 2.4 57.0 56.5 99.2 2.4 -27.4 
November 2006 109.9 1.5 2.2 56.6 57.6 100.2 4.1 -28.5 
December 2006 109.8 1.6 1.9 56.5 57.6 102.5 2.4 -19 
January 2007 109.2 1.4  55.5 57.9 103.2 1.1 -3.6 
February 2007 109.7 1.6  55.6 57.5 102.6 2.0 2.9 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. 4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, 
West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
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In the services sector, activity was buoyant in the 
last quarter of 2006, suggesting that this sector's 
role in the euro area's economic growth is 
increasing. Looking ahead, the European 
Commission's survey shows a stabilisation of 
confidence in the services sector in January and 
February, above its long-term average (Graph 6). 
Reuters Service Index displayed a small drop in 
February after an increase in January, but it 
remains well above its long-term average. With 
sentiment indicators continuously pointing to 
robust growth and with domestic demand 
gaining momentum, activity in the services sector 
should remain strong in the next few months.  
By contrast, developments in the construction 
and retail sectors' indicators point to some loss 
of momentum in these sectors. In February, the 
confidence indicator for the construction sector 
recorded its third consecutive decline. While the 
indicator remains at a high level, it seems to have 
passed its peak. This is at odds with the value 
added in the construction sector, which 
accelerated to 1.4% in the last quarter of 2006, 
compared to 1.1% in the previous quarter. But it 
is in line with a probable easing of housing 
demand in the euro area as a result of high house 
prices and rising mortgage rates.  
In February, the confidence indicator for the 
retail sector recorded its fourth consecutive and 
now stands significantly below its peak. The 
decrease in February mainly resulted from a 
sharp decrease in confidence among retailers in 
Germany. This is not surprising as retail sales in 
Germany dropped by 5.1% month-on-month in 
January after a 2.6% increase in December. The 
strong fall was clearly a reaction to the VAT hike. 
The survey seems to indicate that the retail sector 
has passed its peak. However, one should be 
cautious about drawing any conclusions on 
future consumption. First, the VAT hike in 
Germany has clearly blurred the picture in 
February. Second, the capacity of retail surveys to 
predict future consumption has proved to be 
quite poor.  
Short-term outlook and risks 
According to the Commission services' Interim 
Forecast released on 16 February, economic 
growth should continue at a robust pace, though 
moderating to 2.4% in 2007. This represents a 
0.3 percentage point upward revision compared 
with the Commission services’ Autumn 2006 
Forecast. The revision is mostly due to the 
stronger-than-expected carry-over from 2006, 
coupled with a slightly higher growth profile for 
2007. GDP growth is expected to moderate 
temporarily in the first quarter of 2007, mainly 
reflecting developments in Germany. It should 
then rebound to around 0.6% during the 
remaining quarters of the year.  
Regarding prices, the forecast has been revised 
downwards, with HICP inflation now projected 
to average 1.8% in 2007, i.e. 0.3 percentage 
points lower than in the autumn 2006 forecast. 
The more optimistic outlook for inflation is 
mainly the result of the rather moderate impact 
of the German VAT hike and the expected 
easing of oil prices.  
On the domestic side, the near-term risks to the 
favourable growth outlook seem to be balanced. 
With steady improvements in the labour market, 
labour income could increase more than 
expected, which could lead to higher-than-
expected household consumption. In line with 
improvements in the labour market, real wage 
increases could go beyond productivity increases 
and therefore have an upward effect on prices.  
Over a longer horizon, downside risks seem to 
prevail and to be related to the external 
environment. First, a sharper-than-expected US 
slowdown could hamper growth in the global 
economy. Second, due to the recent turbulence 
in the global equity markets, uncertainties 
regarding global financial markets have increased 
(see Box 1). In the US, there is also a risk that the 
observed deterioration in the sub-prime 
mortgage market spills over to other parts of the 
financial sector. Third, a further appreciation of 
the euro/dollar exchange rate could erode the 
competitiveness of euro-area exports. Fourth, oil 
prices could remain volatile during 2007 due to 
continued risks of geopolitical tensions. Finally, 
the disorderly unwinding of global imbalances 
continues to be a threat to the global growth 
outlook.  
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
-    - 11
Box 1: Winter storms on financial markets 
 
In the first two months of 2007, financial markets were characterised by a continuation of favourable trends, with 
buoyant stock markets and low volatility on bond and foreign exchange markets. In the last week of February, 
though, stock markets dropped significantly, amidst increased investor risk aversion and volatility.  
 
Stock markets tumbled worldwide at end-February 
As with the episode of market turbulence in mid-2006, the initial fall in equity prices drop was short-lived. There was 
evidence of a stabilisation in prices after the initial drop, followed by a second decline shortly after. Overall, equity 
prices are significantly lower than at the beginning of the turbulence. By 14 March, the EuroStoxx had lost more 
than 8% since the beginning of the turmoil on 26 February. Other major stock markets were down by between 4% 
(Dow Jones) and 8% (Nikkei). Since then, stock markets have slightly recovered and offset some of their losses.  
Stock indices 
(Index 3/1/06=100, 2 Jan 07 to 22Mar 07) 
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Several explanations were brought forward for 
triggering the market tumble. There had been a steady 
rise in global equity market prices in the preceding 
weeks, which did not seem based on economic 
fundamentals. The abrupt decline in equity prices in 
China was then triggered by investor nervousness 
following the authorities’ establishment of a special 
task force to tackle illegal securities activity and media 
reports of a possible monetary-policy tightening. The 
latter development was seen as implying a prospective 
slowdown in the global economy. Uncertainty about 
the global economy was intensified by some weaker 
US economic data, with durable goods orders falling 
by more than expected and the US housing market 
remaining subdued with problems in the US mortgage 
market. Investor sentiment was undermined by 
reports that Alan Greenspan had spoken of a possible 
recession in the US economy in 2007. While none of 
these factors alone would have been expected to 
impact heavily on financial markets, their combined 
effect on investor confidence may have been enough 
to provoke the widespread market turbulence.  
Source: Commission services. 
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Safe haven effects drive government bond yields down  
As investors fled to safety, major bond markets gained, resulting in falling yields in the US, Europe and Japan. In 
contrast, emerging-market debt yield spreads (as measured by the benchmark JP Morgan EMBI+ index) widened to 
almost 200 basis points, up from the record low 164 basis points recorded just before the outbreak of the market 
jitters. The spread reached 240 basis points during the market turmoil in May and June 2006.    
Stock market turmoil leads to unwinding of carry trade 
As a consequence of the stock market turmoil, foreign exchange markets were temporarily dominated by the massive 
unwinding of carry trades. Between the beginning of the turmoil and its (temporary) trough, the yen gained almost 
5% against the US dollar and the euro and as much as 7 to 9% against high-yield currencies such as the South 
African rand, the Turkish lira, the New Zealand dollar and the Brazilian real. In nominal effective terms, the yen 
gained some 5% until 5 March. Other low-interest currencies including the Swiss franc and the Czech koruna also 
appreciated, albeit to lesser extent. As stock markets stabilised in the second week of March, currency movements 
ebbed as well financial market participants seemed to restore carry-trade positions and the yen lost most of its earlier 
gains.  
Monetary and financial conditions  
Since December 2005, the Governing Council of 
the ECB has raised interest rates by a total of 175 
basis points to presently 3.75%. The last rate hike 
was decided on 8 March 2007. The ECB 
decisions to hike interest rates were motivated by 
upside risks to price stability, identified by the 
Governing Council through both the economic 
and monetary analyses. Moreover, the interest 
rate hikes should anchor medium to longer-term 
inflation expectations in the euro area at levels 
consistent with price stability.  
Graph 7: ECB minimum bid rate and 3-month 
EURIBOR (in % – 4 Jan 99 to 22 Mar 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Although interest rates are still at relatively low 
levels, the policy rate hikes have led to some 
further tightening of monetary conditions in the 
euro area as measured by a Monetary Conditions 
Index (MCI). 
Graph 8: Euro-area MCI and its contributors 
(Index Jan 1999=100 – Inverted scale – Jan 99 to Feb 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Since the beginning of the year, the dollar-euro 
exchange rate has for most of the time fluctuated 
around USD/EUR 1.30. After the G7 meeting in 
Essen in mid-February, the euro staged a mini-
rally, bringing the bilateral rate slightly above 
USD/EUR 1.31. The euro reached an all-time 
high against the yen on 22 February when it 
stood at JPY/EUR 159.5. In the wake of the 
stock market turbulences, the yen (temporarily) 
reversed some of its losses. While the bilateral 
dollar-euro exchange rate remained relatively 
stable during the stock market turbulences, the 
euro continued its rally against the US and 
climbed above USD/EUR 1.33 (see also Box 1).  
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In general, foreign exchange movements are still 
mainly determined by (expected) interest rate 
developments and hardly by concerns about 
global imbalances. The good data for GDP 
growth in the fourth quarter of 2006 in the euro 
area and an improved outlook for 2007 in 
conjunction with market expectations of further 
interest rate hikes in the euro area supported the 
euro. In addition, lower-than-expected economic 
data weakened the US dollar. 
Graph 9: USD/EUR exchange rates and interest rate 
differential (1 Jan 06 to 22 Mar 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 10: 10-year government bond yields 
(in % – 2 Jan 06 to 22 Mar 07) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The opposing news in the euro area and the US 
since February resulted in a narrowing of 
(expected) interest rate differentials across the 
whole maturity spectrum. As regards long-term 
interest rates, 10-year-government-bond yields in 
the US have declined by around 30 basis points 
since early February, while they only lost 20 basis 
points in the euro area. As a consequence, the 
interest rate differential narrowed to around 60 
basis points, the lowest level since early 2005. 
The downward trend of government bond yields 
was intensified in recent weeks in the wake of the 
financial market turmoil (see box 1). 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2007 
 
 
 
-    - 14
2.  Is the yield curve still predicting 
recessions? 
Tightening monetary policy and declining long-
term interest rates have recently drawn attention 
to the empirical relationship between the yield 
curve and economic growth, in particular 
recessions. This discussion started in the US, 
where the Fed raised the federal funds rate in 17 
consecutive meetings from June 2004 to July 
2006, taking it from 1% to its current level of 
5.25%. At the same time, long-term interest rates 
declined during most of 2004 and 2005, leading 
to an inverted yield curve. With some delay, the 
phenomenon of a flattening yield curve also 
emerged in the euro area where the ECB has 
progressively increased interest rates since 
December 2005 from 2% to 3.75% in March 
2007. Falling long-term interest rates in most of 
the second half of 2006 also contributed to the 
flattening of the yield curve.  
Historically, pronounced yield curve inversions in 
the US and the euro area have tended to be 
followed by recessions about a year later. Since 
the yield curve has typically outperformed other 
recession indicators, it is an important variable to 
monitor. 
This section begins with a conceptual discussion 
of the yield curve and its relationship to real 
economic activity. It then reviews the predictive 
power of the US and euro-area yield curve and 
discusses what the present shape of the yield 
curve might tell us.  
Theoretical explanations for the relationship 
between the yield curve and growth 
The yield curve is the difference between long 
and short-term interest rates. In the following 
analysis, the yield curve is always defined as the 
difference between 10-year-government-bond 
yields and three-month treasury bills. The yield 
curve normally has a positive slope with long-
term interest rates higher than short-term rates. 
This relationship reflects increasing risk premia 
as both inflation and the future health of the 
borrower become more uncertain as the time 
span extends. The gap between long and short-
term interest rates, however, fluctuates 
considerably over time, and at times becomes 
negative. Empirical research has shown that an 
inverted yield curve has preceded all recessions 
but one in the US since 1960.  
The literature on the yield curve's ability to 
predict recessions has been predominantly 
empirical, documenting correlations rather than 
building theories to explain such correlations. 
This focus on empirics may have created the 
unfortunate impression that there is no good 
explanation for the relationship. In fact, there is 
no shortage of reasonable explanations, many of 
which date back to the early literature on this 
topic and have now been extended in various 
directions. The literature presents two main 
explanations related to (i) monetary policy and; 
(ii) inter-temporal consumer choices.4 These 
explanations are to a large extent compatible and, 
viewed in their totality, suggest a robust 
relationship between the yield curve and 
recessions. 
Monetary policy influences the slope of the yield 
curve. A tightening of monetary policy means a 
rise in short-term interest rates, typically intended 
to lead to a reduction in inflationary pressures. 
Whereas short-term interest rates are relatively 
high as a result of the tightening, long-term 
interest rates reflect long-term inflation 
expectations and real interest rates. A rise in 
short-term interest rates induced by monetary 
policy could be expected to lead to a future 
slowdown in real economic activity and demand 
for credit, putting downward pressure on future 
real interest rates, while slowing activity may also 
result in lower expected inflation.  
Another reason for an inverted yield curve 
before a recession is based on inter-temporal 
consumer choices.5 A central assumption is that 
                                                     
4  See for example Estrella, A. (2005), 'The Yield Curve as a 
Leading Indicator: Frequently Asked Questions', Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, capital markets web page. 
Moneta, F. (2003), 'Does the yield spread predict 
recessions in the euro area?' ECB Working Paper No. 
294, December 2003. Estrella, A, A. Rodrigues and S. 
Schich (2000), 'How stable is the predictive power of the 
yield curve? Evidence from Germany and the United 
States', Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 85, No. 3, 
August 2003.  
5  See Harvey, C. (1988), 'The real term structure and 
consumption growth', Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 22. Hu, Z. (1993), 'The yield curve and real activity', 
IMF Staff Paper No. 40. 
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consumers prefer a stable income. In a simple 
model where only bonds are available as financial 
security, consumers who rationally anticipate a 
recession will increase current savings in order to 
boost future income. As a consequence, long-
term interest rates will go down and short-term 
interest rates will increase due to a shift in 
preferences.  
Predictive power of yield curve is supported 
by data… 
The slope of the yield curve obviously depends 
on movements in both short and long-term 
interest rates. However, there is no fundamental 
reason why a rise in the level of current short-
term interest rates should have the same 
predictive content for a recession as a fall in 
average expected future nominal interest rates 
over, say, the next ten years. A look at the US 
shows that a flattening of the yield curve and a 
subsequent inversion has always been preceded 
by a sharp increase in short-term interest rates 
(see Graph 11). However, rising policy rates have 
not necessarily led to a flattening of the yield 
curve, which indicates that the long end of the 
yield curve matters as well.6  
Graph 11: US yield curve and recessions 
(in % – Jan 1960 to Feb 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
                                                     
6  This is already clear from the fact that a sharp monetary 
tightening is not always followed by a recession. 
…not only in the United States… 
The analysis of the behaviour of interest rates of 
different maturities over the business cycle goes 
back to the beginning of the 20th century.7 Since 
then, a vast number of studies have been 
published on the predictive power of the yield 
curve in the US.8 All of these papers find highly 
significant relationships between the yield curve 
and real activity with lead times ranging roughly 
from 1 to 8 quarters. It is noteworthy that, in 
many studies, the yield curve comes out as the 
best single predictor of recessions compared with 
other indicators. However, its overall predictive 
power remains somewhat limited. In particular, it 
is worth stressing that inversions of yield curves 
have not always been followed by recessions so 
that the yield curve has sometimes sent false 
recession signals.  
Graph 12: US 10-year, 3-month interest rates and 
recessions (in % – Jan 1960 to Feb 2007) 
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Graph 12 illustrates the relationship between the 
yield curve and recessions. The dates of US 
recessions are those officially determined by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
which defines a recession as a significant decline 
in activity spread across the economy, lasting 
                                                     
7  Mitchell, W. (1913), 'Business cycles', University of 
California Press. 
8  See for example Mishkin, F. (1990), 'What does the term 
structure tell us about future inflation?', Journal of Monetary 
Economics, No. 25. Estrella, A. and G. Hardouvelis (1991), 
'The term structure as a predictor of real economic 
activity', Journal of Finance, Vo. 46, No. 2. Estrella, A. and 
F. Mishkin (1998), 'Predicting US recessions: financial 
variables as leading indicators', Review of Economic and 
Statistics, Vol. 80, No. 1. Estrella (2005), ibid. 
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more than a few months, visible in industrial 
production, employment, real income and 
wholesale retail trade.  
…but also in the euro area 
While some studies provide additional evidence 
of the relationship between the yield curve and 
economic recessions for some countries of the 
European Union, only a very few studies on the 
euro area as a whole have been conducted.9 This 
is often related to the lack of sufficiently long 
time series for the euro area and the fact that the 
euro area so far has only experienced one 
business cycle which did not include a technical 
recession. In fact, even when using a constructed 
euro-area aggregate for the pre-EMU period, the 
last recession (defined as two consecutive 
quarters of declining GDP) would date back to 
1992/93.  
Graph 13: The yield curve and sharp downturns, euro 
area (in % – Jan 1975 to Feb 2007) (1) 
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(1) Sharp downturns are identified by applying a Baxter-King filter 
to euro-area GDP data. 
Source: ECB, Commission services. 
To get some idea of the relationship between the 
yield curve and economic growth in the euro 
area, Graph 13 plots the euro-area yield curve 
against the three major cyclical downturns 
experienced since the 1980s.10 Two out of the 
                                                     
9  See for example Estrella, A. and F. Mishkin (1997), The 
predictive power of the term structure of interest rates in 
Europe and the United States: Implications for the 
European Central Bank, European Economic Review, 
No. 41 and Estrella, A., A. Rodrigues and S. Schich 
(2003), op. cit. 
10  The major downturns were identified by extracting the 
cyclical component of euro-area GDP with a Baxter-King 
three downturns were preceded by an inversion 
of the yield curve. In the case of the most recent 
downturn in 2001, the yield curve was close to 
flat.  
Data for the euro before 1999 should of course 
be considered with prudence. The yield curve for 
the euro area before 1999 is hypothetical and is 
strongly affected by changes in monetary policy 
regimes across both time and Member States. 
Graph 14 therefore displays the yield curve and 
recessions for Germany, taken here as a proxy, 
since the relation between its yield curve and 
growth should be less blurred by statistical 
problems. As illustrated by the chart, all four 
recessions in Germany since 1970 were preceded 
by an inverted yield curve.11 
Graph 14: The yield curve and recessions, Germany 
(in % – Jan 1975 to Feb 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
The current situation seems to be different 
from the past 
The above suggests that at the current juncture, 
the inverted yield curve in the US and the 
virtually flat curve in the euro area should predict 
an economic recession on both sides of the 
Atlantic in the course of 2007.  
                                                                              
filter. The periods shown correspond to the interval from 
peak to trough. Only downturns with losses of output gap 
of more than 2% were considered. With this procedure, 
the early 2000s downturn qualifies as a major downturn 
although it did not include a technical recession (i.e. at 
least two consecutive quarters of declining GDP). 
11  In the chart, recessions were defined as at least two 
consecutive quarters of declining GDP.  
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A more formal approach to the predictive power 
of the yield curve (see Box 2) shows that for the 
US, there is presently a 40 percent chance of a 
recession one year from now. This is a much 
lower probability than in the periods preceding 
the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s but similar 
to the probability before the last two recessions, 
in the 1990s and early 2000s. The probability for 
the euro area is of the same magnitude as for the 
US. However, the estimates for the euro area 
might be distorted as it formerly encompassed 
different monetary regimes as well as slightly 
different business cycles. The formal approach 
for the euro area showed that there has been 
more "noise" between downturns. 
Germany is therefore also taken as a proxy in this 
case. Here, the yield curve currently attributes 
only a 10 percent probability to a recession 12 
months from now.  However, when interpreting 
the result for Germany, one needs to bear in 
mind an important caveat. Since 1999, the short-
term interest rates have been determined by the 
ECB for the euro area as a whole. Short-term 
interest rates and hence the yield curve in 
Germany might have been different, had there 
still been a national monetary policy. 
Graph 15: Yield curves in the euro area and the US 
(in % – Jan 1999 to Feb 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The current debate is also casting doubt more 
generally on the usefulness of the yield curve as a 
predictor of future growth.12 Broadly speaking, 
                                                     
12  See Greenspan (2005), Letter to the Honourable Jim Saxton, 
Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, 28 November 
2005. Estrella (2005), op.cit. Bernanke (2006), Reflections on 
the Yield Curve and Monetary Policy, remarks before the Economic 
Club of New York, Federal Reserve Board, 20 March 2006. 
there are two main factors suggesting that the 
current flattening of the yield curve might be 
explained by other factors than the imminence of 
a recession: namely the exceptionally low level of 
bond yields and monetary policy.  
Several global factors – often interrelated – have 
been put forward to explain the evolution in 
global long-term rates in recent years.13 These 
factors include: (i) the mis-pricing of risks due to 
a coincidence of excess liquidity in the 
international financial system and investor search 
for yield; (ii) Asian central bank purchases of US 
Treasury bills to maintain their currency pegs; 
(iii) underinvestment in the corporate sector; 
(iv) the prospect of population ageing, putting 
pressure on pension funds to make significant 
additions to longer-term bond portfolios; (v) oil 
bill recycling, and (vi) the fact that in reaction to 
higher oil prices, financial market participants 
seem to price in lower growth rather than higher 
inflation.  
The flattening of the yield curve might also signal 
a deceleration in inflation accompanied by a 
favourable growth outlook, e.g. once the impact 
of an adverse oil price shock has dampened. 
Inflation expectations (both short- and long-
term) in both the US and the euro area are 
currently much lower than during any episode 
preceding recessions.  
This leads to the second reason often cited for 
why the current yield curve flattening might not 
indicate a recession: central banks' increased 
credibility to maintain price stability. If financial 
markets believe that central banks will raise 
interest rates in the future and that this is likely to 
correspond with lower expected inflation, 
expected future nominal interest rates could stay 
the same. The argument of increased central 
bank credibility is also supported by the fact that 
inflation variability has dropped significantly 
since 1970. 
Some argue that several factors related to the 
predictive power of the yield curve could affect 
its slope, including the gap between near- and 
long-term inflation expectations or near- and 
long-term risk premia. In fact, the key 
component from which the yield curve derives 
                                                     
13  See also the analysis in the Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area, Volume 4 No. 4 (2005). 
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Box 2: Estimating the predictive power of the yield curve 
 
Although the strong relationship between inverted yield curves and recessions already emerges from a pure graphical 
analysis, it has also been tested empirically in several studies. Following the approach taken by Estrella* and 
Moneta**, we have estimated the probability of a recession in the US, Germany (as a proxy for the euro area), and in 
the euro area based on a standard probit model.  
 
Probability of recessions according to the yield 
curve, euro area (in % – Jul 75 to Sep 07) (1) 
Probability of recessions according to the yield 
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(1) Based on an estimated probit model. 
Source: Commission services. 
(1) Based on an estimated probit model. 
Source: Commission services. 
One important question, when assessing the predictive power of the yield curve, is what definition of recession to 
use. Official data on business cycle turning points exist for the US (published by NBER) but not for the euro area or 
individual euro-area countries. Another quite common approach is to define a recession as a period of two quarters 
of consecutive negative GDP growth. In the empirical analysis presented here, the NBER definition was applied for 
the US. For Germany, two quarters of consecutive negative GDP growth was used. For the euro area, a recession 
was defined as a period of sharp economic downturn, i.e. the period between a cyclical peak and trough as extracted 
from the euro-area GDP with a Baxter-King filter. 
In the probit model used, the dependent variable was a dummy variable R where R=1 if the economy is in a 
recession and R=0 when it is not.  In formal terms, the probability of a recession at time t, with a forecast horizon of 
k periods, is given by the following equation: )()1Pr( 10 ktt XccR −+== φ ,  
where φ  is the cumulative standard density function, and X is the set of explanatory variables used. In our estimates, 
X was defined as the standard yield curve (10-year interest rates minus 3-months interest rates). Monthly data was 
used and several lags were tested.  
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Source: Commission services. 
The best results were achieved by applying a lag of 
12 months for both the US and Germany; and a lag of 7 
months for the euro area. When interpreting the results, 
three issues should be noted. First, the GDP aggregate 
for the pre-EMU period masks national differences. The 
recession in the early 1990s, for example, hit Germany 
later than other Member States. Second, the yield curve 
for the euro area before 1999 is hypothetical and is 
strongly affected by the varying monetary policy regimes 
which applied in the different countries. The use of an 
artificial aggregate and a hypothetical yield curve could 
therefore blur the analysis. Third, the predictive power 
of the yield curve appears to be stronger in the 1970s 
and 1980s than in the 1990s. 
 
* Estrella, A. and M. Trubin (2006), 'The yield curve as a leading 
indicator: some practical issues', Current Issues in Economics and 
Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Vol. 12, No. 5. 
** Moneta, F.  (2003), ibid. 
 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
-    - 19
much of its predictive power for future GDP 
growth is the gap between the current and long-
run levels of the (real) policy rate. That is, when 
the key policy rate is high relative to its long run 
level, the chance of a recession increases. In fact, 
since 1970 all inverted yield curves leading to or 
predicting a recession in the US were driven by 
policy rates above their 'neutral' or long-term 
level. At present, the policy rate in the US, even 
at 5.25 percent, is probably still below or around 
its 'neutral' level.14 Due to a lack of data for the 
euro area, earlier episodes of an inverted yield 
curve cannot be compared to the monetary 
stance at the time. However, the data available 
indicates that nominal short-term interest rates 
were above long-term expectations for nominal 
GDP growth in 2000, while they are currently 
still below.  
Graph 16: Euro-area nominal GDP growth 
expectations(1) and short-term interest rate  
(in % – 1999Q1 to 2007Q1) 
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(1) Nominal GDP growth expectations are taken from the ECB 
Survey of Professional Forecasters.  
Source: Ecowin. 
Finally, the nature of the business cycles has 
changed. Up to the 1990s, typically, monetary 
policy was tightened because inflation went up. 
Consequently, an economic slowdown followed. 
In such a world, not surprisingly, an inverse yield 
curve would precede a recession. The latest 
business cycle since the bursting of the dotcom 
bubble has been characterised by low inflation. 
                                                     
14  The long-term growth rates of potential nominal GDP 
give an indication of where the neutral interest rate may 
be. For the US, the estimate of the Congressional 
Budgetary Office for potential nominal GDP growth is 
5.8%.  
Conclusion 
The historical relationship between the yield 
curve and economic growth is broadly supported 
by academics and analysts. For the US in 
particular, an inversion of the yield curve has 
been a "safe bet" predictor of an upcoming 
recession. On this side of the Atlantic too, the 
yield curve has showed some predictive power in 
the case Germany and the euro area as a whole.  
At the current juncture, however, the traditional 
relationship seems to be less straightforward. The 
inverted yield curve in the US and the almost flat 
yield curve in the euro area might not necessarily 
signal a recession. The main reasons for a 
possible structural break of the relationship are 
the exceptionally low level of bond yields, excess 
liquidity, the high credibility of monetary policy 
and the still low levels of policy interest rates 
compared to long-term or neutral levels. One 
might even wonder whether under the current 
circumstances a flat yield curve could even be 
stimulating economic growth in a period of 
tightening monetary policy? 
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3.  The Lisbon Agenda for the euro area: 
the 2007 update of the Integrated 
Guidelines  
On 8/9 March 2007, the European Council 
endorsed the 2007 update of the Integrated 
Guidelines,15 which contain two sets of 
recommendations. The country-specific 
recommendations essentially require Member 
States to speed up the implementation of the 
structural reforms that they themselves have 
committed to undertake in their National 
Reform Programmes. The euro-area 
recommendations focus on those reforms that 
are especially relevant for the smooth 
functioning of monetary union, that is, on 
reforms that compensate for the loss of the 
independent use of interest or exchange rate 
policies. Adjustment and growth are linked: slow 
adjustment particularly harms countries that 
suffer from adverse shocks and eventually 
lowers the prospects of strong growth and high 
employment in the euro area as a whole.16 
This section presents the rationale behind the 
four policy recommendations addressed to the 
euro area, namely: (1) increasing the room for 
manoeuvre for budgetary policy; (2) ensuring a 
composition of public spending and revenues 
more conducive to growth; (3) enhancing 
competition in and integration of product and 
financial markets; and (4) achieving a better 
alignment of wages and productivity, a better 
balance between employment protection and 
security in the labour market, and greater labour 
mobility.  
                                                     
15  Since the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, the 
Integrated Guidelines combine the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (Art. 99(2)) and the Employment 
Guidelines (Art. 128(4)). 
16  For a detailed analysis of adjustment in the euro area, see 
the EU Economy 2006 Review 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/the
_eu_economy_review_en.htm. 
Recommendation 1 – Make use of the 
favourable cyclical conditions to aim at or 
pursue ambitious budgetary consolidation 
towards their medium-term objectives in line 
with the Stability and Growth Pact, hence 
striving to achieve an annual structural 
adjustment of at least 0.5% of GDP as a 
benchmark 
While the issue of fiscal sustainability is common 
to both euro-area and non-euro-area Member 
States, the fiscal policy stance of the euro area as 
a whole has the features of a public good and 
impacts on the single exchange rate and interest 
rate and hence on the macroeconomic policy-
mix in the euro area. The absence of national 
monetary and exchange rate instruments in 
EMU makes fiscal discipline all the more 
important as a way of enhancing Member States' 
capacity to absorb asymmetric shocks. In other 
words, the ability to withstand adverse economic 
surprises, either though the full play of 
automatic stabilisers or potentially though 
discretionary action, depends on the room for 
manoeuvre created in good times. Fiscal 
discipline also facilitates the task of a single 
monetary policy in preserving price stability.  
Graph 17: Cyclically-adjusted budgetary developments, 
euro area (% of GDP) (1) 
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(1) Excluding UMTS revenues. Primary spending and balance 
exclude interest expenditures. Autumn 2006 Forecast for 2007. 
Source: Commission services. 
The difficulties faced by several Member States 
in complying with the agreed 3% government 
deficit reference value during the past growth 
slowdown can be traced back to their fiscal 
behaviour in the early years of EMU. Budgetary 
consolidation was relaxed when growth 
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conditions became favourable. In cyclically-
adjusted terms, primary public expenditures 
declined by a mere ½ pp of GDP between 1997 
and 2000 while revenues (excluding UMTS 
revenues) diminished by 1.5% of GDP. This 
caused the primary balance to deteriorate by 
about 1% of GDP during a strong cyclical 
upswing (Graph 17).  
In 2006, nine of the current 13 Member States 
recorded a structural deficit in excess of their 
medium-term objective and the structural deficit 
is forecast to remain above the medium-term 
objective until 2008 in almost all of them. 
Despite favourable cyclical conditions, a 
structural improvement of more than 0.5 pp of 
GDP is predicted to occur in only three Member 
States in 2007 (DE, IT, LU) and in one Member 
State in 2008 (FR). 
Table 4: Structural government balances and 
medium-term objectives (in % of GDP) (1) 
Country MTO Structural balances 
  2006 2007 2008 
DE 0 -2.0 -1.5 -1.5 
IE 0 2.9 1.8 1.8 
EL 0 -3.4 -2.8 -2.3 
ES 0 1.8 1.5 1.6 
FR 0 -2.5 -2.2 -1.6 
IT 0 -3.9 -2.5 -1.9 
LU -0.8 -1.3 -0.5 -0.1 
NL -0.75 0.4 -0.1 0.0 
PT -0.5 -3.4 -2.6 -1.8 
FI 2.0 2.9 2.7 2.7 
(1) Data not available yet for BE and AT.  
Source: Commission services calculations on the basis of the 2006-
07 updates of the National Stability Programmes. 
 
Box 3: EMU and the Lisbon Strategy: key dates and procedures 
Cooperation and coordination of structural reforms in the European Union is covered by the Community's strategy 
to increase jobs and raise its growth potential, the Lisbon Strategy. Broadly speaking, achieving more jobs and 
growth is to be attained by reforms in product markets, budgetary institutions, financial and labour markets. The 
Lisbon Strategy is for the whole Community, not just the euro area, but members of the euro area have an added 
incentive to undertake integrated structural reforms - such reforms will strengthen their capacity to adjust to 
economic shocks in a monetary union. Therefore, in its Annual Progress Report on the state of implementation of 
the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission has included a fiche dedicated to the euro-area, which focuses on reforms that 
are especially relevant for the smooth functioning of monetary union. 
 
Autumn 
2005 
Each Member State produced a three-year strategic plan, its National Reform Programme (NRP), which 
defined the main national challenges to be overcome to achieve the Lisbon objectives, as well as the policies 
designed to address those challenges.  
January 
2006 
The Commission assessed the NRPs with a view to identifying whether the challenges addressed by the 
Member States match the individual reform needs. The assessment included a fiche for the whole of the euro 
area that summarised the economic challenges and reform commitments identified by the euro-area Member 
States. 
Autumn 
2006 
The NRP was followed by Member States' Implementation Reports (IR) that showed where progress had 
been made to meet Member States' own reform strategies. The Commission submitted a Community Lisbon 
programme that reported on progress with policy measures at the Community level. 
December 
2006 
In its 2006 assessments of the IRs, the Commission highlighted what it considers to be the strengths and 
weaknesses of reform in each Member State. A separate assessment was produced for the euro area, the so-
called euro-area fiche, comparing the progress with reforms in the NRPs with the area-specific reform needs. 
The concluding section of the Commission's assessment included specific policy recommendations that cover 
those areas where weaknesses need to be tackled with the highest priority. These conclusions and 
recommendations were addressed to each Member State and to the euro area. 
Winter 
2006/2007 
The concluding sections of the Commission's assessment were discussed by the Council in view of adopting a 
Council Recommendation on the 2007 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (Art. 99(2)) and the Employment 
Guidelines (Art 128(4)) addressed to each Member State and, in the case of the euro-area fiche, all the euro-area 
Member States. They were endorsed by the European Council on 8/9 March 2007.  
Note: The Commission's assessments are in the public domain, having been published as its Annual Progress Report (APR), 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/annual-report-1206_en.htm.  
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Fiscal consolidation is not only crucial to 
generate room for manoeuvre to withstand 
negative cyclical shocks but also in view of the 
challenges posed by ageing. Ageing populations 
and high levels of public debt may jeopardise 
fiscal sustainability in several Member States. A 
number of Member States undertook reforms to 
their pension and health system in the past years 
or announced further measures in their National 
Reform Programmes, with the objective of 
reducing the budgetary costs of ageing 
populations. Analysis in the Commission's 
sustainability report suggests that future public 
debts would be considerably reduced if Member 
States accomplished the medium-term budgetary 
objectives by 2010. 17 
Recommendation 2 – Improve the quality of 
public finance by reviewing public 
expenditures and taxation, with the 
intention to enhance productivity and 
innovation, thereby contributing to 
economic growth and fiscal sustainability 
The structure of public expenditure and the 
design of the tax system can have a significant 
impact on growth potential. For example, 
taxation may distort economic decisions on 
labour market participation, savings, investment 
and risk-taking, with crucial effects on hours 
worked and labour productivity.18  
Over the last years, Member States have carried 
out important reforms of their tax systems, with 
the objectives of creating a more employment-
friendly labour taxation, and of rationalising and 
simplifying the tax system. Reforms have also 
aimed at responding to the challenges emerging 
from ageing populations, which are likely to 
reduce the labour tax base and at the same time 
                                                     
17  See also Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 5 
No. 4 (2006), pp. 38-48. 
18  Some economists argue that both low productivity 
growth and low labour utilisation in terms of hours 
worked in Europe are essentially due to the impact of 
taxation. See for example, Prescott, E. (2004), 'Why Do 
Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?' 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 
vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 2-13, or Gordon, R.J. and I. Dew-
Becker (2006), 'The Slowdown in European Productivity 
Growth: A Tale of Tigers, Tortoises, and Textbook 
Labor Economics', http://faculty-
web.at.northwestern.edu/economics/gordon/nber_SI_p
ercapita_060803.pdf.  
increase the demand for social spending as well 
as from globalisation, which may render it 
increasingly difficult to collect taxes from mobile 
tax bases. 
Graph 18: Public spending on growth-enhancing 
items, euro area (1) (in % of GDP) 
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(1) Most recent observation is 2006 for public investment, 2004 for 
R&D and 2003 estimate for education. 
Source: World Economic Forum, Commission services. 
However, there remains considerable scope for 
efficiency improvements for tax systems and 
public spending. Regarding the latter, it is 
important to re-direct public expenditure from 
public consumption towards the more 
'productive items' which may boost economic 
growth and particularly towards R&D and 
education which have emerged as important 
determinants of productivity growth.19 Beyond 
this composition effect, it is also critical to raise 
the value for money of public spending in each 
spending category. There is indeed substantial 
evidence of a lack of efficiency in spending in 
some countries and the relation between the 
amount of public spending and the actual 
performance is frequently weak. This is, for 
instance, illustrated by the fact that countries 
which spend more on their public education 
systems do not necessarily have public schools 
of higher quality (Graph 19).  
A number of countries have undertaken or 
announced measures in their National Reform 
Programmes to improve the efficiency of public 
administration and establish control institutions, 
including through policies for better regulation, 
                                                     
19  For a comprehensive review of the quality of public 
finances, see European Commission, 'Public finances in 
EMU 2004', European Economy No 3/2004. 
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i.e. reducing the administrative burden and 
ensuring a more widespread use of impact 
assessments when new legislation is 
introduced.20 
Graph 19: Efficiency of public spending in 
education (1) 
FI
BEIE
DKCZ FR
AT
EE
SE
EURO AREA
HUDE LU
UK
SK LV
SIMT CYRO PTIT
EL
BG
ES
3
4
5
6
7
15 20 25 30 35 40
Expenditure on public educational institutions, 2003
Qu
ali
ty 
of 
pu
bli
c s
ch
oo
ls 
Ind
ex
, 2
00
6
 
(1) The quality index stems from the World Economic Forum It 
ranges from 1 (poor quality) to 7 (best in the world). Annual 
expenditure on public educational institutions per pupil/student 
compared to GDP per capita, for all levels of education combined, 
based on 2003 full-time equivalents. 
Source: World Economic Forum, Commission services. 
Recommendation 3 – Effectively implement 
measures that improve competition, 
especially in services, … 
There is evidence that weak competition in the 
services economy has contributed to low 
economic growth, a lack of resilience to 
economic shocks and protracted adjustment to 
growth and inflation differences in the euro area: 
• The increased productivity gap with the US 
is largely driven by productivity advances in 
the US due to its greater use of ICT in 
services.21 A low degree of competition 
affects productivity because it reduces the 
pressure on service suppliers to implement 
innovative new technologies, improve work 
organisation and introduce new products. 
Moreover, imperfections in the services 
sector tend to affect the rest of the economy 
                                                     
20  Since this issue applies to all countries and not only to 
the euro area, it was not included in the original 
Commission's list of recommendations, but added later 
at the request of the euro-area Member States. 
21  See the focus section on services in QREA Vol. 5, No 2 
(2006), pp 25-36. 
as services are an important intermediate 
input into many industries. 
• Enhanced competition in services could 
help foster price flexibility. Service inflation 
persistently runs at a relatively high rate and 
downward price rigidity is markedly higher 
in services than in the rest of the economy, 
which contributed to the slow decline in 
inflation in the 2000-03 growth slowdown.22  
• A further justification for treating 
competition in the service economy as a 
special concern of the euro area relates to its 
potentially important impact on the capacity 
to shift resources between tradables 
(industry) and non-tradables (services), 
which has been identified a major 
adjustment channel for current account 
imbalances.23  
Graph 20: Deregulation in service industries, euro 
area (1) (OECD regulation index 0 to 6) 
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(1) GDP-weighted average of national indices. Excluding 
Luxembourg and, for professional services, Greece. The retail 
services figure is for 1998, not 1996.  
Source: OECD, Commission services. 
Competition in many services tends to be less 
intense than in manufacturing due to their 
                                                     
22  Research by the ECB's Inflation Persistence Network 
found a frequency of price changes in services lower than 
in both the rest of the economy and the US services 
sector See Altissimo, P. et al. (2006), 'Inflation 
persistence and price setting in the euro area – A 
summary of the IPN evidence', ECB Occasional Paper 
No. 46. 
23  See Obstfeld, M. and K.S. Rogoff (2005), 'Global current 
account imbalances and exchange rate adjustments', 
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity 1/2005, pp. 67-
123. 
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intrinsically lower degree of tradability, but also 
because of domestic regulation of entry, 
operational restrictions and price controls. 
However, technical progress in information and 
communication technologies has increased the 
tradability of communication and business 
services. Moreover, the adoption of the 
Directive on Services is a welcome step towards 
a Single Market for services. It must be 
transposed into national law before December 
2009. Progress in deregulating network 
industries, the retail sector and professional 
services has also been made over the past decade 
(Graph 20).  
There is some first evidence that market opening 
and the deregulation of services has started to 
pay off. For example, some recent studies have 
found benefits in terms of employment, 
productivity and lower prices from both market 
opening to foreign competitors24 and 
deregulation.25 
Recommendation 3 (cont.) – …and step up 
measures that promote the full integration of 
financial markets and competition in retail 
financial services 
The special emphasis on financial services 
underscores their importance for overall 
economic activity. Furthermore, there is a clear 
euro-area dimension because the introduction of 
the euro implies a big leap towards an integrated 
financial market. Integrated financial markets 
also have an important role for economic 
adjustment. An efficient financial market 
facilitates the re-allocation of resources across 
sectors and firms, which strengthens resilience 
to economic shocks. The cross-border 
diversification of portfolios helps smooth 
income shocks and therefore lower exposure to 
risks.  
                                                     
24  Studies on the economic impact of the Services Directive 
are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/services-
dir/studies_en.htm.  
25  See for example, ECB (2006), 'Competition, productivity 
and prices in the euro area services sector', Occasional 
Paper No. 44, Faini, R. (2006), 'Contrasting Europe's 
decline: do product market reforms help?', in Boeri et al. 
(eds.), Structural reform without prejudices, Oxford University 
Press.  
To some extent, financial integration has already 
increased the cross-border diversification of 
risks within the euro area. This is indicated in 
Graph 21 by a declining correlation between 
GDP and GNP growth across countries. They 
are indicative of some decoupling between 
domestic production (GDP) and domestic 
income (GNP), which is caused by the 
increasing importance of income flows from 
capital and to some extent labour income from 
abroad (i.e. the difference between GDP and 
GNP).  
Graph 21: Cross-country correlation between GDP and 
GNP growth across 12 euro-area Member States (in %)  
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Though many financial market segments, 
especially government bond markets and large 
cap stocks, are already highly integrated, there is 
still evidence of fragmentation in the retail 
sector. In this regard, euro-area Member States 
should have a special interest in addressing the 
remaining obstacles to the full integration of 
financial markets. 
It also appears important to intensify the 
monitoring of competition in the retail financial 
sector. A recent sector inquiry by the 
Commission on retail banking found large 
variations in interest rates charged and offered, 
in prices for payment services and in the 
profitability of service providers across the 
Member States. Differences across countries in 
legal, regulatory and tax systems and language 
may explain part of the fragmentation of retail 
banking markets along national lines. However, 
the inquiry identified various barriers to entry 
that may prevent foreign banks and payment 
card providers from penetrating new markets 
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such as discriminatory rules that impede access 
to financial infrastructure (payment card 
networks, clearing and settlement, credit 
registers), product tying practices and high costs 
of changing banks in some Member States.  
Recommendation 4 – Improve flexibility and 
security on labour markets, …  
Labour market developments have been the 
positive surprise of recent years. Job creation has 
been much higher and the increase in 
unemployment much lower during the latest 
downturn than could have been expected on the 
basis of past slowdowns. Despite the 
improvement in labour market performance, a 
number of indicators such as wage 
developments, labour market institutions and 
information about the mobility of labour suggest 
that the adjustment of employment to shocks in 
the euro area remains slow.  
Recommendation 4 (cont.) – …inter alia by 
better aligning wage and productivity 
developments, …  
Now that the disappearance of national 
monetary and exchange rate policies put the 
adjustment burden on market forces, a higher 
degree of wage flexibility in the euro area is 
warranted. This would also have a favourable 
effect in reducing price stickiness, most 
importantly in labour-intensive services. It would 
also allow euro-area Member States to adjust 
faster to competitiveness pressures, since low 
wage flexibility has been identified as a reason 
behind the slow adjustment of growth 
differences across countries via the 
competitiveness channel.26  
Table 5 suggests that the responsiveness of wage 
growth differences to cyclical differences differs 
across euro-area countries and is asymmetric 
with regard to the stage of the cycle considered, 
i.e. wage growth accelerates more strongly when 
the output gap is positive than it decelerates 
when the output gap is negative. If GDP is 
running above potential (estimate I), the 
responsiveness of wages to the output gap is 
highest for Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Germany and lowest for Austria, France and 
                                                     
26  See EU Economy 2006 Review.  
Greece. In recessions (estimate II), the elasticity 
has been generally lower than in booms and 
significant in only a handful of countries 
(Germany, Spain, Ireland, Finland and Portugal), 
meaning that wages are relatively unresponsive 
to cyclical conditions in several Member States.27 
Table 5:  Elasticity of relative wage growth with 
respect to the business cycle differences (1) 
 I. Output gap > 0  II. Output gap < 0 
 Elasticity Elasticity 
BE 0.88 (***) -0.17 
DE 1.15 (***) 1.38 (***) 
IE 0.77 (***) 0.71 (***) 
EL 0.28 -0.72 
ES 1.21 (***) 1.02 (***) 
FR 0.08 -0.01 
IT 1.98 (***) -0.13 
NL 1.37 (***) -0.09 
AT -0.3 0.21 
PT 1.03 (***) -0.68 (*) 
FI 0.85 (***) 0.59 (***) 
(1) All values were expressed relative to the weighted average of 
remaining euro area countries using bilateral trade weights. 
Output gap lagged by 1 year. Significance levels:  *** for 1%, 
** for 5%, * for 10%. For more details, see EU Economy 2006 
Review, Chapter IV, Table 6.
Source: Commission services. 
 
The differentiation of wages across regions, 
sectors and occupations is equally relevant for 
both adjustment capacity and job creation. While 
there is little data on wage differentiation on a 
comparable cross-country basis, the 
continuously high rates of long-term 
unemployment and the persistence of regional 
differences in employment performance suggest 
that there is scope for a better alignment of wage 
and productivity developments in some Member 
States. 
Recommendation 4 (cont.) – …balancing 
employment protection and security in the 
market …  
Better job allocation will require more 
responsive labour demand and supply and 
accompanying policies to give mobile workers 
more employment security. More investment in 
human capital, more efficient public 
employment services and active labour market 
                                                     
27  Using a different angle, research from the International 
Wage Flexibility Project found that real wages in almost 
all euro-area Member States have more downward 
rigidity than in the US. Information on the international 
Wage Flexibility Project is available at 
http://brookings.edu/es/research/projects/iwfp.htm.  
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policies, a rebalancing of employment protection 
and measures to foster a more flexible work 
organisation could be instrumental in this regard. 
The security aspect implies a major emphasis on 
activation policies, whereby the unemployed 
receive unemployment benefits but at the same 
time are encouraged to re-enter the labour force 
by means of re-integration measures. As regards 
flexibility, the liberalisation of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) has been the most 
controversial issue. Estimates suggest that 
countries with tighter EPL have more pro-
cyclical unit labour costs but more stable 
employment over the cycle.28 
Table 6: Development of the Employment 
Protection Legislation index (1) 
 Regular workers Temporary workers 
 Late 1990 2003 2006 
Late 
1990 2003 2006 
BE 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 
DE 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.8 
IE 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.6 0.6 
EL 2.3 2.4 2.4 4.8 3.3 3.2 
ES 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.3 3.5 3.4 
FR 2.3 2.5 2.5 3.6 3.6 3.3 
IT 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.6 2.1 2.1 
NL 3.1 3.1 2.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 
AT 2.9 2.4 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
PT 4.3 4.3 4.3 3 2.8 2.8 
FI 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Euro area 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.5 2.4 
USA 0.2 0.2 NA 0.3 0.3 NA 
(1) The tighter EPL, the higher the index. 2006 is a tentative ECFIN 
estimate based on LABREF (the database on labour market reforms 
prepared by DG ECFIN and the EPC). Euro area is a GDP-
weighted average of available Member States. 
Source: OECD, Commission services. 
 
Over the last few years, several euro-area 
Member States have reformed their EPL, but as 
the OECD indicator suggests, these reforms 
have (i) been small, (ii) started from a high level 
of EPL compared to the US and (iii) largely 
focused on temporary workers (Table 6). Policy 
targeted at 'increasing flexibility at the margin', 
for instance increasing the share of fixed-term or 
temporary contracts relative to the standard 
open-ended employment contracts, has had 
some detrimental segmentation effects on the 
labour market. While helping improve the 
employment outlook of temporary workers, 
these reforms have worsened the prospects for 
                                                     
28  See EU Economy 2006 Review, Chapter IV for the 
estimates.  
temporary workers to eventually move into 
regular labour contracts. 
Graph 22: Rates of unemployment per occupation, 
euro area 2006Q2 (1) 
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(1) Previous occupation of unemployed in % of employed and 
unemployed in the same occupation.  
Source: Commission services. 
Recommendation 4 (cont.) – …and enacting 
measures to promote labour mobility across 
borders and between occupations  
It is well known that labour mobility is low in 
the euro area. This of course applies to mobility 
across borders, which is understandable because 
language differences function as a natural 
barrier, despite some policy progress in 
addressing obstacles, for example by increasing 
the recognition of professional experience or 
improving the portability of social benefits. But 
it also holds for mobility across regions and 
occupations.  
• In the EU-15, it is estimated that in any 
given year 0.1% of the active working-age 
population change their country of 
residence.29  
• Every year between 2000 and 2005, about 
1% of the working-age population moved 
residence across regions (NUTS 1), 
compared to around 3% in the USA.  
• A recent Eurobarometer survey showed that 
one third of all employees had worked for 
                                                     
29  For a review of geographic mobility, see European 
Commission (2006), "Employment in Europe 2006", 
Chapter 5.  
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the same employer more than 10 years, and 
18% for more than 20 years. 
For the US, it has been shown that inter-state 
migration plays a key role in adjustment to 
regional shocks.30 Since labour mobility is much 
lower in the euro area than in the US, migration 
contributes much less to adjustment, which 
therefore occurs largely through changes in 
unemployment and participation. Increasing the 
mobility of labour would therefore reduce the 
impact of regional developments on local 
unemployment and reduce the share of 
discouraged workers in the labour force, thereby 
facilitating regional adjustment.  
Low job flows increase the risk of labour-market 
mismatches. The effect of little job mobility is 
evident in striking differences in rates of 
unemployment across occupations. A number of 
policies may impact on occupational mismatch, 
including more efficient public employment 
services, training and active labour market 
policies, more flexible wages and increased wage 
differentiation. 
                                                     
30  Blanchard, O. and L. Katz (1992), "Regional evolutions", 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, pp. 1-75.  
Conclusion  
While the euro-area Member States' National 
Reform Programmes address many of the 
reform areas needed to raise growth and 
employment, it has become apparent that those 
structural reforms that are particularly relevant 
for improving the smooth functioning of the 
euro area have not featured prominently in 
them. 
Therefore, the euro-area fiche of the Integrated 
Guidelines formulates four recommendations 
aimed at ensuring a more efficient internal 
adjustment mechanism in EMU. The euro-area 
Member States are expected to take these 
recommendations into account in their national 
policies together with the recommendations 
specific to their country. They are therefore 
expected to be reflected in their future National 
Reform Programmes and their implementation 
to be discussed in depth. 
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Focus 
II. The contribution of labour cost developments to price stability 
and competitiveness adjustment in the euro area 
This focus assesses the extent to which wage and labour cost developments have facilitated and can be expected to facilitate two 
policy objectives within the euro area, namely aggregate price stability and sustainable competitive positions at individual 
country level. Evidence shows that brightening economic conditions have not translated into accelerating wage growth so far; 
meaning that unit labour cost developments have remained consistent with price stability and employment-friendly growth.  
However, this aggregate picture of subdued labour cost pressures conceals sizeable differences across euro-area countries. Much 
of the overall benign wage developments in recent years is due to significant wage moderation in Germany where nominal unit 
labour costs had stagnated over the period 2002 to 2006, while in a non-negligible number of euro-area countries nominal 
unit labour costs had grown more rapidly. As a result, persistent differentials in price competitiveness and concomitant 
widening current account imbalances have built up since the inception of the monetary union. Thus, over and above wage 
moderation, there is a need for relative competitive positions to be rebalanced. The challenge here is to further enhance wage 
flexibility at country level and thus speed up competitiveness adjustment through smooth, employment-friendly dynamic 
processes. Rebalancing competitive positions among euro-area countries will necessarily mean that those countries which need to 
regain intra-area competitiveness have to keep unit labour cost growth below the euro area average. Achieving such an outcome 
will be a major challenge.  
Over the short-term, increasing signs of tightening labour market conditions and the aforementioned sizeable differences across 
euro-area countries present potential upside risks. Should wages in Germany return to more standard patterns, then 
unchanged wage and price-setting behaviour in other countries would clearly entail pressures for the euro area as a whole, 
jeopardizing price stability. Looking further ahead over a longer time span, measures to increase labour supply availability 
and heightened competition in product and labour markets brought about by structural reforms and globalization should help 
to keep a lid on excessive wage claims. Moreover, some rebound in trend productivity growth, following recent structural 
reforms in the euro area, should help to moderate unit labour cost growth while preventing the whole burden of adjustment 
from falling on wages.  
1. Introduction 
Euro-area Member States share a single monetary 
policy directed towards price stability. In EMU, it 
has become even more important than in the 
past for wage developments in each country to 
be in line with the macroeconomic requirements, 
both at euro-area and at individual-country level.  
At the aggregate euro-area level, nominal wage 
developments should not jeopardize price stability. Wage 
moderation helps to reduce inflationary 
pressures, thereby creating room for a more 
accommodative monetary stance. This aggregate 
requirement translates into the condition that 
nominal wage increases should not exceed the 
sum of trend productivity and the price stability 
target of the ECB of close to but below 2%.  
At individual-country level, wage flexibility plays a 
pivotal role in facilitating the adjustment of divergent 
external positions among euro-area members. Persistent 
inflationary wage pressures in one Member State 
will sooner or later, via its effect on relative unit 
labour costs, depress competitiveness and 
employment in that country. Although part of 
the necessary intra-euro-area adjustment process, 
especially in the event of asymmetric cyclical 
positions, a protracted structural loss of relative 
competitiveness needs to be avoided as its 
reversal could prove costly in terms of losses of 
output and employment. Short of national 
monetary policies, the current challenge is to 
further enhance wage flexibility at country level 
so as to speed up competitiveness adjustment 
through smooth, employment-friendly dynamic 
processes.31 Rebalancing competitive positions 
                                                     
31  For a detailed analysis of the role played by wage-setting 
behaviour in the adjustment process in the euro area, see 
European Commission (2006), "The EU Economy 2006 
Review: Adjustment Dynamics in the Euro Area", 
European Economy, No 6. 
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within the monetary union requires that those 
countries which need to regain intra-area 
competitiveness keep unit labour cost growth 
below the euro-area average. 
This focus assesses to what extent wage and 
labour cost developments have facilitated and 
can be expected to facilitate the aforementioned 
policy objectives, i.e. price stability at euro-area 
level and sustainable competitive positions at 
individual-country level. To this end, Section 2 
reviews the latest wage and labour cost 
developments while Section 3 discusses short to 
medium-term wage and labour cost prospects 
together with certain policy considerations as to 
the functioning of labour markets both at the 
current juncture and the medium to long run. 
Section 4 draws a number of concluding remarks. 
2. Recent labour cost developments and 
prospects  
Inflationary pressures stemming from the 
labour market remain subdued 
Brightening economic conditions have not 
translated into accelerating wage growth so far. 
Notwithstanding a period of brisk growth in the 
euro area and gradually declining unemployment, 
wage moderation has continued to prevail. The 
latest information conveyed by the various 
indicators of labour costs does not seem to point 
to any significant emergence of permanent 
upward wage pressures in 2006.  
All harmonized nominal wage indicators show 
that the moderate wage pressures recorded in 
2005 also prevailed in 2006. Looking at the latest 
information (Graph 23 and Table 6), the various 
labour cost indicators point to continued 
moderation in wage growth in the third quarter 
of 2006.  The acceleration in compensation per 
employee (CPE) registered in the second quarter 
did not persist in 2006Q3 as the annual rate of 
change declined from 2.4% in the second quarter 
to 2.2% in the third quarter. Also, the growth 
rate of total hourly labour costs as measured by 
the Eurostat Labour Cost Index (LCI) fell to 
                                                                              
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/the_
eu_economy_review_en.htm 
2.0% in the third quarter, from 2.3% in the 
previous three quarters.  
Annual growth in nominal unit labour costs 
remained stable at about 0.9-1% in 2006. This 
stems from the combination of moderate growth 
in compensation per employee and an increase in 
labour productivity growth. The increasing use of 
opt-out clauses and flexible contractual formulae 
may have contributed to keeping labour costs on 
the moderate growth path observed since the 
launch of the euro. 
Graph 23: Quarterly nominal wage growth, euro area  
(y-o-y changes in % – 2001Q1 to 2006Q3)  
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Source: Commission services. 
Over a longer time span, Table 7 shows that 
during the period 1999-2005 nominal wage 
developments in the euro area-12 have been 
consistent with the goal of price stability, i.e., 
nominal unit labour cost growth has been lower 
than the 2% price-stability target of the ECB, 
thus indicating negative real unit  labour cost 
growth of -0.4%.  
Moderate wage increases are also reflected in 
Graph 24 where the GDP deflator, which 
measures the 'price' of total value added per unit 
of output, is decomposed into its various 
components of income, i.e. unit labour costs, 
gross operating surplus and net indirect taxes per 
unit of output. A look at Graph 24 suggests, first 
of all, that the domestic price pressures reflected 
in the annual rate of change of the GDP deflator 
have been more contained in recent years,  
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2007 
 
 
 
-    - 30
Table 7: Recent labour cost indicators in the euro area (1) (year-on-year growth rates in %) 
 2003 2004 2005 2005Q3 2005Q4 2006Q1 2006Q2 2006Q3 
Negotiated wages 2,4 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,0 2,1 2,4 2,0 
Total hourly labour 
costs 3,1 2,3 2,3 2,1 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,0 
Compensation per 
employee 2,0 2,1 1,6 1,5 1,9 2,1 2,4 2,2 
Memo items:         
Labour productivity 0,3 1,0 0,7 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,2 
Unit labour costs 1,7 1,1 0,9 0,6 0,9 0,9 1,0 1,0 
(1) Excluding Slovenia. 
Source: Commission services. 
standing at around 2% since 2004 after having 
been as high as 3% in late 2001. The second 
point that this income decomposition unveils is 
that the contribution of unit labour costs to the 
growth in the GDP deflator decreased 
significantly from 2002 onwards, finishing at 
about half a percentage point in 2005. 
Conversely, the contribution of net indirect taxes 
has increased over time, while that of profits has 
remained broadly constant. Thus, on average, 
producers have been able to maintain profit 
margins despite strong non-labour input cost 
pressures and heightened international 
competition. 
Graph 24: Income decomposition of GDP deflator, 
euro area (% contribution to y-o-y changes of GDP 
deflator) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Looking at sectoral wage developments, the 
latest available data (Graph 25) reflect a general 
decline in the rate of growth, the sharpest fall 
being recorded in the industrial sector, although 
it still remains significantly above the growth 
rates registered in construction and market 
services. From a long-term perspective, the 
average growth rate of total hourly labour costs 
over the period 1999Q1-2006Q3 amounted to 
3.1% in industrial sectors, and 3.0% in both 
construction and services sectors. The fact that 
labour costs increased by a similar amount over 
the period 1999-2005 in both manufacturing and 
services confirms that the persistently high 
inflation differentials between services and 
goods are due to differing sectoral labour 
productivity developments32 and that wage 
growth in services appears to be much less 
aligned with productivity than wage growth in 
manufacturing, thus creating upward pressures 
on services prices in the euro area.  
Graph 25: Sectoral labour cost developments, euro area 
(changes y-o-y in % – 1999Q1 to 2006Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
32  This analysis is in line with the so-called 'Scandinavian 
model of inflation', according to which prices in the 
sector exposed to external competition (i.e. the 
manufacturing sector) will generally align with external 
prices. With an integrated labour market, wage 
developments will be similar in both the exposed sector 
and the sheltered sector (i.e. the services sector) and will 
be determined by developments in external prices and in 
productivity in the exposed sector. If productivity is 
slower in the sheltered sector, prices in that sector will 
grow faster than in the exposed sector.  
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Productivity growth in industry averaged 2.3% 
and only 0.2% in services during the period 
1999-2005. The comparatively weak 
performance in services can be explained in part 
by constraining regulations, less scope for 
technological change and less exposure to 
international competition. 
However, this picture of subdued labour 
costs pressures conceals sizeable country 
differences  
At country level, sizeable differences across 
euro-area countries in nominal compensation 
per employee and unit labour costs growth have 
built up since the inception of EMU. The 
historically low average growth rate of 2.6% in 
nominal compensation per employee in the euro 
area over the period 1999-2005 needs to be seen 
in conjunction with the very low growth 
recorded in Germany, reflecting, inter alia, the 
impact of reductions in social security 
contributions on labour costs. Excluding 
Germany from the euro-area aggregate would 
yield an average growth rate of 3% over the 
same time horizon. Similarly, nominal unit 
labour costs increased at an annual rate of 1.5% 
for the euro-area, as against 2.2% when 
Germany is excluded from the aggregate 
(Graph 26).  
Looking in more detail at country-specific 
developments (Table 8), it is easy to see that 
wage growth differentials are relatively high. 
Both Germany and Austria have experienced 
moderate wage pressures, with average growth 
rates of compensation per employee of 2.0% 
over the period 1999-2005. By contrast, the 
highest wage growth has been recorded in 
Greece (6.4%) and Ireland (6.0%). The 
remaining countries are in the range of 2.6% to 
4.3%. Moreover, wage growth differentials 
across countries appear to have been only 
loosely related to relative productivity growth 
differentials, which are low across euro-area 
countries. Consequently, persistent wage growth 
differentials are also reflected in fairly divergent 
growth rates of unit labour costs. Average 
growth of nominal labour costs in the euro area 
over the period 1999-2005 amounted to 1.5%. 
Again, such moderate aggregate behaviour was 
mainly driven by Germany (0.4%) and, to a 
lesser extent, Austria (0.5%). At the other end of 
the spectrum, pronounced increases in nominal 
labour costs were recorded in Portugal (3.5%), 
Ireland and Luxembourg (2.9% each), Greece 
(2.8%) and Spain, Italy and the Netherlands 
(around 2.6% each), with varying patterns in 
terms of composition. Substantial increases in 
compensation per employee - Ireland, Greece 
and the Netherlands -, weak productivity gains - 
Spain and Italy - or a combination of the two –
Portugal and Luxembourg - governed the 
behaviour of nominal unit labour costs.  
 
Table 8: Labour cost developments, euro area 
(average percentage change 1999-2005) 
% change 
year-on-year 
Comp. per 
employee 
Labour 
productivity 
Nominal 
unit labour 
costs 
  BE   2,7 1,2 1,5 
  DE   2,0 1,6 0,4 
  EL   6,4 3,5 2,8 
  ES   3,0 0,4 2,6 
  FI 3,2 1,8 1,4 
  FR   2,6 0,9 1,7 
  IE   6,0 3,1 2,9 
  IT   3,0 0,4 2,6 
  LU   3,7 0,8 2,9 
  NL   4,2 1,7 2,5 
  AT   1,9 1,4 0,5 
  PT   4,3 0,8 3,5 
  EA 12   2,6 1,0 1,5 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Graph 26: Compensation per employee and nominal 
unit labour costs, euro area with and without Germany  
(Index 1999=100) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Divergent unit labour cost developments 
across countries have contributed to 
widening current account differences within 
the euro area  
The widening dispersion of current account 
positions within the euro area may not be a 
matter of concern to the extent that they reflect 
asymmetric cyclical positions of national 
economies or a financial deepening process 
fostered by the euro and European financial 
market integration.33 However, widening current 
account positions also reflect certain imbalances 
within euro-area countries which are attributable 
to a series of non-benign factors. One such 
factor is the difficulty encountered by some 
countries in aligning wage behaviour with 
productivity developments, which arises from 
insufficient nominal and real flexibility in labour 
markets. This is particularly so in a selected 
number of countries, namely Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain. Graph 27 shows to what 
extent relatively slow wage responses to growth, 
inflation and current account differentials within 
the euro area have resulted in prolonged 
under/over-shooting dynamics in intra-euro-area 
real effective exchange rates, which are in turn 
accompanied by protracted adjustment periods. 
Graph 27: Intra-euro-area real effective exchange rates 
based on unit labour costs, selected countries 
(Index 1999=100) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
 
                                                     
33  There is some evidence that the euro and financial 
integration have allowed Member States with bigger 
financing needs (i.e. catching-up economies) to tap 
international capital markets more easily. See Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 5, No 4 (2006).  
A number of factors lie behind wage 
moderation 
Moderate increases in wages in the euro area 
over the past few years can be explained by a set 
of factors, most prominent among them sluggish 
productivity growth, less prevalent use of 
automatic wage indexation coupled with 
enhanced credibility of monetary policy, the 
impact of globalization, structural changes in the 
euro-area labour market and last, but not least, 
country-specific factors applying to Germany 
over recent years.34 Particular emphasis is given 
here to weak labour productivity growth. To 
illustrate the point, a cyclical comparison has 
been made (Graph 28) of labour productivity 
developments in the current recovery (namely 
when GDP bottomed out in 2003Q2) with the 
average of the past three major recoveries 
(starting respectively in 1975Q3, 1982Q4 and 
1993Q2). Labour productivity, which typically 
displays a pro-cyclical pattern, has expanded by 
1.1% (quarter-on-quarter annualized) in the euro 
area in the current recovery, which compares 
poorly with the average pace of 2.5% in previous 
recoveries  
Graph 28: Labour productivity across cycles, euro area 
(Index=100 at trough) 
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Source: Commission services. 
It is also interesting to compare developments in 
the current recovery with the average of the past 
three recoveries. This comparison shows that 
the pace of expansion in real wages in the euro 
area during the current recovery is substantially 
lower than that observed in past recoveries. 
                                                     
34 All these causes were already explored in Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area Vol. 5 No3 2006. 
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More specifically, twelve quarters after the start 
of the current upswing average real wage growth 
(as measured by the annualized quarter-on-
quarter growth rate of compensation per 
employee) turns out to be slightly negative at -
0.1%, compared to average growth of 2.1% in 
the previous three recoveries (Graph 29). 
Graph 29: Real wages across cycles, euro area 
(Index=100 at trough) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Moderate increases in wages did not prevent 
private consumption from being supportive 
of domestic demand in 2006 
With consumer confidence on an upward trend 
since mid-2005 and real disposable income 
improving in line with favourable labour market 
developments, consumer spending is benefiting 
from supportive conditions. In 2006 the labour 
market improved considerably in the euro area. 
After four years of subdued growth at around 
0.7% per year, employment growth accelerated 
to around 1.4% in 2006, representing some 
2 million new jobs. Meanwhile, the euro-area 
unemployment rate pursued its donward course, 
reaching 7.4% in January 2007.  
With real consumption wages moderating at a 
time when the outlook for employment growth 
is brighter, the question arises as to the relative 
importance of the two components of the real 
wage bill (wage rate and employment) in driving 
real private consumption. Whereas it is often 
stressed that moderate real wage growth 
contributes to the weakness of private 
consumption, it is obviously more appropriate to 
emphasize the role of the total real wage bill (i.e. 
real wages multiplied by employment) in the 
transmission channels from labour market 
developments to aggregate consumption. In 
recent years, growth in the total wage bill in the 
euro area has been boosted by strong 
employment creation. Furthermore, econometric 
analysis presented in a previous issue of this 
report suggests that employment growth is a 
more important determinant of households' 
private consumption than the growth of real 
wages per employee.35 
3. Short and medium-term outlook  
In the short term there are increasing signs 
of tightening labour market conditions 
In line with brightening economic conditions, 
employment expectations remain high. 
According to the Commission's Autumn 2006 
Forecasts, total employment will grow by 1.2% 
and 1.1% in 2007-2008. The unemployment rate 
is set to drop further, albeit modestly, to 7.7% 
and 7.4% of the labour force in the euro area in 
2007-2008. Although structural unemployment 
is forecast to fall further in 2007 and 2008, the 
unemployment gap (i.e. the gap between actual 
and structural unemployment rates) is expected 
to close over that period, meaning that, at least 
in the short term, there are increasing signs of 
tightening labour market conditions.  
Lessons from the past suggest that the evolution 
of unit labour costs in the euro area fits well with 
the unemployment gap.36 Nevertheless, the 
quantitative impact of a diminishing 
unemployment gap on wage inflation will 
depend on a number of factors. On the one 
hand, in the current context of brisk 
employment growth, trade unions could aim to 
reverse the decline in the wage share that has 
taken place over an extended period by 
demanding wage increases beyond productivity 
trends.   
                                                     
35  Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 5, No 1 (2006), 
pp. 15-20. 
36  See Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 5, No 4 
(2006), pp.4. 
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On the other hand, although the incidence of 
automatic wage indexation has reduced in the 
past few years and the threat of second-round 
effects has not been confirmed so far,37 close 
monitoring of wage-setting behaviour on a 
country basis will be required in the immediate 
future so as to add credibility to the scenario of 
moderate wage growth. Specifically, after 
stabilising at around 2% in the past three years, 
the Commission's Autumn 2006 Forecasts 
indicate some slight wage growth acceleration in 
the short term  (to 2.2% in 2007 and 2.5% in 
2008) due to new wage agreements being 
implemented in selected euro-area countries, 
namely Germany, Belgium, Ireland and the 
Netherlands. More generally, even if the 
evolution of wages in 2007 is not a major cause 
of concern, some upward risks could arise in 
2008 which should therefore be identified well 
ahead.  
In the medium term several factors are likely 
to ease labour cost pressures  
In the medium term, three main factors could 
put a lid on labour cost pressures.  
Firstly, a stronger than expected reduction in the 
structural unemployment (or NAIRU), owing to 
the unfolding of recent reforms can increase 
flexibility in both labour and product markets. 
Secondly, labour market reforms designed to 
enhance labour force growth can help to 
alleviate inflation pressures emanating from the 
supply side. Overall, labour force growth 
appears to have been relatively strong between 
2001 and 2005. This is partly due to 
immigration, but it also reflects an underlying 
increase in participation, especially among the 
younger and older age groups. Looking ahead, 
however, labour force growth is expected to 
decelerate and in some cases even turn negative, 
owing to the projected slowdown in working age 
population growth. In that respect, economic 
policy must play an important role in supporting 
                                                     
37  Globalization and increased product market competition 
brought about by the effective completion of the internal 
market in the EU may have adversely affected the 
bargaining power of workers and the capacity of firms to 
increase mark-ups in tradable sectors, thereby dampening 
the extent to which oil price increases can trigger second-
round effects. 
the developments of the labour force, for 
example by providing incentives to older males 
to delay retirement and by supporting flexible 
contracts that allow the youth and prime-age 
women in particular to reconcile study and 
family life with work. Measures aimed at 
enhancing labour mobility and the reallocation 
of labour from declining firms or sectors to 
expanding ones can be expected to alleviate 
labour market bottlenecks. 
Thirdly, the likely favourable contribution of 
labour productivity growth, should the recent 
rebound turn out to be of a structural nature, 
could partly or totally offset the effect of higher 
wage demands on inflation.38 The latest data 
show that labour productivity in the euro area 
has averaged an annualised rate of 1.6% since 
the beginning of 2006, compared with an 
average change of rate of 0.7% during the 
previous decade. The jury is still out on whether 
the recent rebound in productivity is purely 
cyclical or whether it contains an element of 
trend reversal to weakening productivity 
dynamics observed over the past decade. On the 
one hand, part of the recent increase in labour 
productivity growth could be regarded as 
transitory, on the basis that its pro-cyclical 
behaviour may be reflecting the lagged response 
of employment - a quasi-fixed production 
factor- to output growth. On the other hand, 
ongoing reform efforts in product and labour 
markets as part of the renewed Lisbon strategy, 
combined with a rising investment/GDP ratio 
and in particular productivity-enhancing ICT 
investment, may also have led to structural 
improvements, setting the path for moderate 
unit labour cost growth. The fact that the 
ongoing acceleration is broadly based across the 
larger euro-area Member states, most notably 
Germany, France and Spain, and that it 
comprises sectors, i.e. services, conventionally 
less sensitive to the business cycle, provides 
support for the hypothesis that the productivity 
revival is not solely due to a cyclical recovery. To 
conclude, the evolution of trend productivity 
growth will be key to determining the respective 
role of wages and productivity in the adjustment 
process.  
                                                     
38 For further details on the assessment of recent labour 
productivity developments, see Box 1 in the Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, Vol. 5, No 4 (2006). 
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Improving labour market outcomes: 
interplay between market forces and 
institutions 
Two main policy considerations can be drawn 
from the analysis of recent and prospective 
developments in labour costs. First, price 
stability at euro-area level requires wages to grow 
at a pace compatible with the sum of trend 
productivity and the price stability target of the 
ECB of close to but below 2%. Second, 
employment-friendly intra-euro-area adjustments 
require higher flexibility of wages and prices.  
Putting these policy considerations into 
operation must take due account of the fact that 
wage and labour cost developments are the 
result of a highly complex interplay of social 
partners and market forces. Put differently, the 
responsibility of well-adapted wage-setting 
process continues to fall primarily into the 
domain of the social partners, limiting the direct 
influence government policy can exercise over 
wage bargaining outcomes. Reference might be 
made in this context to the respective guideline 
in the Growth and Jobs Strategy (guideline 4), 
which states that 'Member States should encourage the 
right framework conditions for wage-bargaining systems, 
while fully respecting the role of the social partners, with a 
view to promote nominal wage and labour cost 
developments consistent with price stability and the trend 
in productivity over the medium term, taking into account 
differences across skills and local labour market 
condition', and is particularly suited to providing 
policy recommendations at the present juncture. 
Against this institutional background, two 
factors should be considered. First, wage 
developments should be closely monitored in the coming 
years as inflationary pressures stemming from the labour 
market cannot be ruled out in a number of countries. 
The first part of this section has argued that at 
the aggregate level, short/medium-term 
prospects do not point to any imminent danger 
for stability-conducive wage settlements. 
However, this mild overall risk assessment 
dramatically alters when broken down to 
individual country level. This is particularly the 
case of Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece, which 
in order to regain intra-area competitiveness will 
have to keep unit labour costs growth below the 
euro-area average.  
Second, a major role will be played by structural reforms 
in facilitating smooth intra-euro-area competitiveness 
adjustments. Structural reforms aimed at boosting 
productivity are of paramount importance if the 
whole burden of adjustment is not to fall on 
wages. The re-launch of the Lisbon strategy with 
more clearly focused objectives, and the recent 
boost in productivity are positive signals that the 
euro-area adjustment capability has a good 
chance of improving over time. Euro-area 
Member States have started to address many 
reform areas that are important to stimulate 
growth and jobs. This is documented in the 
Annual Progress Report of December 2006. 
Promising reforms have been undertaken, or 
have been envisaged, to increase labour 
participation rates, boost R&D and innovation, 
develop human capital and create a more 
attractive business environment, notably through 
policies improving the quality of regulation.  
However, further progress is needed in the area of the 
structural reforms to increase the adjustment capacity of 
the euro area. On 8/9 March 2007, the European 
Council endorsed the 2007 update of the 
Integrated Guidelines.39 For the euro area, these 
include, most prominently, strengthening 
budgetary consolidation in good times, reviewing 
public expenditures and taxation with the aim of 
enhancing innovation, implementing measures 
that improve competition, especially in services, 
and improving flexibility and security on labour 
markets by aligning wage and productivity 
developments more closely and by enacting 
measures to promote labour mobility across 
borders and between occupations.40 
4. Conclusions 
This focus report has presented evidence of 
wage moderation making a favourable 
contribution to price stability in the euro area. 
However, recent wage developments have 
recorded sizeable differences across euro-area 
countries that have led to persistent price-
competitiveness imbalances and widening 
                                                     
39  Since the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, the 
Integrated Guidelines combine the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (Art. 99(2)) and the Employment 
Guidelines (Art. 128(4)). 
40  See Section 3 in this issue on 'The Lisbon Agenda for the 
euro area: the 2007 update of the Integrated Guidelines'. 
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dispersion of current account positions, 
reflecting, inter alia, difficulties several Member 
States are having aligning wage increases with 
productivity developments. Thus, over and 
above wage moderation, there is a need for the 
relative competitive positions to be rebalanced 
among the countries participating in the 
monetary union. The challenge here is to further 
enhance wage flexibility at country level and thus 
speed up adjustment through smooth, 
employment-friendly dynamic processes. 
Rebalancing competitive positions among euro-
area countries will necessarily mean that those 
countries which need to regain intra-area 
competitiveness have to keep unit labour cost 
growth below the euro-area average. 
Looking further ahead, subdued wage growth so 
far should not lead to complacency. Given the 
foreseeable tightening of labour market 
conditions, it is crucial for the social partners to 
continue to assume their responsibilities. Price 
stability will require wage agreements at national 
level to take account of intrinsic trend 
productivity developments, the cyclical situation 
of labour markets and the underlying position in 
relative price competitiveness within the euro 
area. Finally, the rules-based and stability-
oriented macroeconomic policy framework of 
EMU, and the heightened credibility of 
monetary policy should underpin the scenario of 
wage moderation. 
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Focus  
III. The reduced volatility of output growth in the euro area 
The volatility of euro-area output growth has declined significantly since the 1970s. The fall has been somewhat less sharp 
than in the US but volatility was and remains lower in the euro area than in the US. The average euro-area picture conceals 
substantial heterogeneity at the individual country level. Most Member States experienced a pronounced drop in volatility in 
the late 1970s or 1980s. In some of them, the trend was partly and temporarily reversed in the late 1980s or early 1990s 
due to strong idiosyncratic shocks. In recent years, however, the volatility of output growth has been quite low by historical 
standards in most Member States. 
The decline in volatility has been broad based across the different GDP components, except for net exports where volatility 
has actually increased. However, the fall has not been uniform. Probably reflecting improved inventory management, changes 
in inventories have played a central role in the process. Investment has also been an important contributor. As regards sectoral 
volatility, the reduction has been widespread throughout the economy but the progressive shift of the production structure from 
goods to services in the euro area only explains a fraction of the reduced volatility. Studies on the US economy have tended to 
downplay the contribution of macroeconomic policies to the decline in output volatility in that country. It is likely, however, 
that both fiscal and monetary policy have played a more prominent role in the euro area where changes in the macroeconomic 
framework have been far more comprehensive than in the US. Finally, and contrary to the US, the possible impact of 
financial market integration on GDP volatility remains so far difficult to discern in aggregate euro-area macroeconomic data. 
There is a broad consensus today that output 
growth in the US has become noticeably less 
volatile over the past 20 years (see Box 4). This 
decline has also occurred, to varying degrees, in 
other industrialised countries.41 While there are 
numerous empirical studies on the decline of 
output volatility for the United States, the 
corresponding research for the euro area is 
sparse and restricted to certain euro-area 
Member States. The aim of this focus is to assess 
the extent of the decline in volatility in the euro 
area and to look at its possible determinants. 
After analysing developments in output growth 
volatility in the euro area (Section 1), the focus 
examines the changes in the volatility of GDP 
components and sectoral value added (Section 2 
and 3). It then discusses the role of monetary 
and fiscal policy as possible determinants of the 
reduction of output volatility (Section 4). A final 
                                                     
41 For studies on the G7 countries see for instance Stock, J. 
H., and Watson, M. W. (2003), 'Has the Business Cycle 
Changed? Evidence and Explanations, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, pp. 9-56. Another reference for G7 
countries is Barrel, R. and S. Gottschalk (2004), 'The 
volatility of the output gap in the G7', NIESR Discussion 
Paper No. 230. For OECD countries, see Cotis, J.P. and 
J. Coppel (2005), 'Business Cycle dynamics in OECD 
Countries: Evidence, Cases and Policy Implications', 
OECD, Paper presented at the Reserve Bank of Australia 
Economic Conference.  
section discusses briefly the role of shocks 
(Section 5).  
1.  Output volatility in the euro area 
To analyse output volatility, standard deviations 
of the euro-area and US GDP growth rates were 
computed for rolling windows of 5 years 
(Graph 30). Over the past 30 years, the volatility 
of output growth has declined substantially in 
the euro area, from 1.93% in the period 
1970Q1-1979Q4 to 1.06% in the most recent 
period (1996Q4-2006Q3). The drop has been 
somewhat less sharp in the euro area (0.86 pp) 
than in the US (1.32 pp). However, the US 
economy posted a much higher level of output 
growth volatility than the euro area in the 1970s 
and, despite some convergence over the past 
three decades, still posts a higher level now.  
While both the US and the euro area 
experienced a fall in output volatility, the 
patterns and timings look very different. A clear 
break in US output volatility series is clearly 
discernable around the mid-1980s. No such 
break is discernible in the case of the euro area. 
The reduction in output volatility seems to have 
started earlier in the euro area, around the mid-
70s, it was partly reversed from the late-80s to 
mid-90s and resumed afterwards.  
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Graph 30: Rolling 5-year standard deviation of y-o-y 
GDP growth rates, euro-area and the US 
(in % – 1975Q4-2006Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The absence of a clear break in the case of the 
euro area can be explained by the fact that 
volatility developments did not follow the same 
pattern in all euro-area Member States. Table 9 
shows the standard deviations of output growth 
for each country. While there is clear evidence of 
a reduction in output volatility in all euro-area 
Member States, the magnitudes and timings 
differ substantially from one country to another. 
Some Member States experienced a much 
stronger decrease than the euro area as a whole 
(Greece, Italy and Spain) and others a more 
moderate decrease (France and Germany). In 
general, the biggest reduction occurred in those 
countries which posted the highest output 
volatility in the 1970s.  
Looking at volatility developments in individual 
countries, two main groups can be identified. 
The first one includes countries where volatility 
decreased sharply in the late 1970s and 1980s 
but where there has been little change over the 
last 15 years. This group includes Austria, 
France, Italy and possibly the Netherlands (for 
which quarterly data are available for a shorter 
period) (Graph 31).42  
The second group includes countries where the 
decrease in volatility was temporarily reversed by 
powerful idiosyncratic shocks in the late 1980s 
or early 1990s. This group includes Finland, 
Germany, Greece and Spain (Graph 32). 
                                                     
42  Quarterly data for the Netherlands are only available 
since 1977.  
Country-specific shocks such as the German 
unification and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
generated boom-and-bust cycles, which brought 
a temporary halt to the trend decline in volatility. 
After these interruptions, output volatility in the 
four countries resumed its downward trend.  
Whatever the group considered, the volatility of 
output growth has been quite low by historical 
standards in most Member States in recent years 
(Finland stands as a major exception).  
Graph 31: Standard deviation of y-o-y GDP growth, 
Austria, France, Italy and the Netherlands 
(in % – 5-year rolling windows – 1975Q4-2006Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Graph 32: Standard deviation of y-o-y GDP growth, 
Finland, Germany, Greece and Spain 
 (in % – 5-year rolling windows – 1975Q4-2006Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
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2.  Volatility of GDP components 
An easy way to learn more about the sources of 
the decline in output growth volatility is to 
decompose GDP into its main components. 
Table 10 displays the standard deviation of the 
contribution of each component to changes in 
real GDP over the indicated time periods.  
The decline in output growth volatility appears 
to have been broad-based across the different 
GDP components (except for net exports where 
volatility has increased) but it has not been 
uniform. By far, the biggest contributor to the 
reduction in volatility in the euro area was 
inventories. Based on covariance estimates, 
inventories have accounted for nearly 70% of 
the decline in GDP volatility since the 1970s.43 
                                                     
43  The variance of GDP can be decomposed into the sum 
of the covariances of GDP with each of its individual 
components. In this setting, the fall in the covariance of 
inventories with GDP between the 1970s and the most 
Today, inventories are less volatile but also less 
pro-cyclical than in the 1970s.  
This is in line with existing studies on the US 
economy which identify stocks as one of the 
main explanations for the decline in volatility in 
that country.44 Despite their small share in total 
GDP, inventories have proved in the past to 
have a strong impact on the business cycle due 
to their pro-cyclicality. Today, the picture is 
rather different. Improvements in inventory 
management techniques have taken place. The 
increased use of information technology and
                                                                             
recent period (1997-2006) can be interpreted as the 
contribution of inventories to the decline in GDP 
volatility. Based on this formula, nearly 70% of the drop 
in the variance of GDP can be attributed to inventories.  
44  See, for example Blanchard, O., and J. Simon (2001), 
'The Long and Large Decline in U. S. Output Volatility', 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 32 (No 1), 
pp. 135-64. 
Table 9: Standard deviation of y-o-y GDP growth in euro-area Member States (in %) (1)  
 1970Q1-1979Q4 1980Q1-1989Q4 1990Q1-1999Q4 1997Q1-2006Q4 
Difference between 
1970Q1-1979Q4 and 
1997Q1-2006Q4 (2) 
BE N.A 1.59 1.68 1.27 -0.31 
DE 2.13 1.73 1.94 1.26 -0.87 
EL 5.44 3.19 2.59 0.97 -4.46 
ES 2.92 1.99 2.03 0.88 -2.04 
FR 1.72 1.15 1.26 1.09 -0.63 
IT 3.28 1.45 1.38 1.30 -1.99 
NL N.A 2.44 1.50 1.62 -0.81 
AT 2.58 1.50 1.10 1.23 -1.35 
FI 3.14 1.70 4.06 1.74 -1.40 
EA 1.93 1.34 1.28 1.07 -0.86 
US 2.62 2.64 1.48 1.30 -1.32 
(1) IE, LU and PT are excluded owing to lack of quarterly data. 
(2) The difference for BE and NL is between 1997Q1-2006Q4 and 1980Q1-1989Q4.                                       
Source: Commission services.  
Table 10: Standard deviation of the contributions of GDP components to changes in GDP, euro area (in %) 
 1970Q1-1979Q4 1980Q1-1989Q4 1990Q1-1999Q4 1997Q1-2006Q4 
Difference 
1997Q1-2006Q4 vs. 
1970Q1-1979Q4  
Private consumption 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.53 -0.17 
Government cons.  0.12 0.13 0.23 0.11 -0.01 
Investment 0.87 0.80 0.76 0.54 -0.33 
    Of which (1): 
    Construction  0.38 0.30 0.21 -0.16 
            Housing  0.21 0.14 0.11 -0.09 
    Equipment  0.51 0.59 0.39 -0.11 
Inventories 1.30 0.56 0.50 0.34 -0.96 
Net exports 0.56 0.86 0.64 0.63 0.07 
(1) The investment breakdown is based on data for DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, FI. 
Source: Commission services. 
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more flexible production methods have made 
for 'just-in-time' production. These 
developments have considerably reduced 
inventory fluctuations.45   
Investment and, to a lesser degree, private 
consumption are, after inventories, the largest 
contributors to the decline in output volatility. 
The two components account, respectively, for 
22% and 36% of the drop in GDP volatility 
since the 1970s.46 This means that consumption 
has contributed to the drop by much less than its 
weight in GDP, whereas the opposite holds for 
investment. 
The decline of investment volatility started in the 
1970s while the decline in consumption volatility 
is much more recent (in the 1990s). As a 
consequence, the fall in volatility in the 1970s 
and 1980s seems to have been more industry 
(and supply) related, with both inventories and 
investment volatility decreasing.  
Unfortunately, detailed investment data have 
only been available since the 1990s for the euro 
area. To expand time coverage, a proxy for 
detailed euro-area investment has been 
computed by aggregating data for six euro-area 
countries (DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, FI). The 
resultant breakdown suggests that all the main 
investment sectors (housing, equipment and 
infrastructure) have played a role in the drop in 
volatility with contributions that broadly reflect 
their weight in total investment. In the empirical 
                                                     
45  A statistical caveat is necessary, however. In some 
countries, the inventory component of GDP is used as 
the adjustment variable to make the GDP identity hold. 
In that case, the inventory component captures not only 
changes in stocks but also errors in the measurement of 
other GDP components. 
46 According to the same covariance calculations. 
literature, residential investment has been put 
forward as a major contributor to the reduction 
in volatility in the US.47 There is however no 
evidence of a similar prominent role for housing 
in the euro area. Volatility in housing investment 
has declined but it does not seem to have played 
a leading role in the overall decline in GDP 
volatility so far.  
Looking further into private consumption, the 
recent fall in the standard deviation of 
consumption growth may be the consequence of 
a lower variability of disposable income, a lower 
variability of the savings rate or consumption 
smoothing (i.e. the fact that fluctuations in the 
savings rate tend to offset fluctuations in the 
disposable income). With more developed 
financial markets, consumers can cushion against 
domestic shocks by borrowing and lending and 
thus achieve a more stable consumption path. In 
the case of the euro area, this form of 
consumption smoothing seems to have played a 
minor role in the recent decline of consumption 
volatility (Table 11). The volatility of the savings 
rate seem to have declined somewhat but the fall 
has been offset by stronger comovements with 
disposable income. In fact, the savings rate 
played a more counter-cyclical role in the 
recession of the 1990s than in the downturn of 
the early 2000.  
Overall, the main contributor to the drop in the 
volatility of consumption growth over the past 
decade was disposable income. The fall in the 
volatility of disposable income can result from 
changes in the volatility of: (i) labour income; 
(ii) non-labour income; and (iii) government 
                                                     
47  See for example Gordon R. J. (2005), 'What Caused the 
Decline in US Business Cycle Volatility?' , NBER 
Working Papers 11777. 
 
Table 11: Variances of y-o-y growth, euro area (in %)  
 19701Q1-1979Q4 
1980Q1-
1989Q4 
1990Q1-
1999Q4 
1993Q4-
2003Q3 
Difference           
1993Q4-2003Q3 
vs. 1990Q1-
1999Q4 
Consumption 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.0 -0.5 
Real Disposable income (Yd) 
      Of which: 2.0 1.9 2.8 1.3 -0.7 
     Real wage bill (2) 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.2 0.1 
Savings rate term (ß) (1) 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.5 -0.4 
2×Covariance (Yd,  ß) -1.4 -0.6 -1.8 -0.9 0.6 
(1) The savings rate term ß is equal to -(s t - s t - 4 ) /(1-s t - 4). Growth in consumption is equal to growth in real disposable income plus the ß term. 
The variance of consumption growth is equal to the sum of the variances of Yd and ß and 2 times the covariances between Yd and ß. 
(2) Variance of the contribution of the real wage bill to real disposable income. 
Source: Commission services, ECB. 
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transfers or taxes. Table 10 shows that labour 
income did not play a big role in stabilising 
disposable income in the latest period. Since 
quarterly data for the other two variables are not 
available, it is not possible to discriminate 
between the other different variables. It is worth 
noting, however, that the decreased volatility of 
disposable income is a-priori consistent with a 
more stabilising role of fiscal policy (via transfers 
and taxes) in the 1990s.  
Neither government consumption nor net trade 
contributed much to lowering output volatility. 
The volatility of government consumption has 
remained stable over the last 35 years while 
volatility of net trade has increased slightly.   
The aggregate euro-area picture is confirmed at 
individual country level. Most euro-area Member 
States have experienced a sharp decrease in the 
volatility of their inventories. Investment and 
private consumption have also decreased but 
more moderately. While the fall in inventories 
and investment volatility was continuous and 
started in the 1970s in all countries, the timing of 
the decrease in consumption volatility differed 
appreciably from one country to another. In 
some countries, the decline started in the 1970s 
(France and Finland) while in others it was more 
pronounced in the latest period (Germany and 
Italy). 
Overall, two major conclusions can be drawn 
from the analysis of GDP components. First, 
most of the reduction in volatility may be 
ascribed to inventories and investment. Second, 
the role of financial market integration and 
financial deepening is difficult to discern in the 
GDP component data. The strong contribution 
of both private consumption and housing to the 
drop in volatility in the US is sometimes taken as 
evidence of the key role of financial markets in 
this process. Unfortunately, the evidence from 
consumption and housing is much less 
compelling in the euro area than in the US. This 
is not to deny the substantial progresses made in 
terms of financial integration in the euro area in 
recent years. But the activity smoothing effect of 
financial integration on household spending 
remains difficult to discern in aggregate 
macroeconomic data at this juncture. 48 
3.  Sectoral volatility 
Further insight into the sources of reduced 
output volatility can be gained from analysing 
the sectoral decomposition of GDP. Eurostat's 
quarterly national accounts provide a breakdown 
of the euro-area's total value added into four 
sectors: agriculture, industry, construction and 
services. With this decomposition, it is possible 
to see whether the reduction in volatility of 
GDP growth has been widespread throughout 
the economy, or whether it has been limited to 
certain sectors.  
Table 12 presents the standard deviations of 
growth in the four sectors for the same time 
periods as in previous tables.49 The only sector 
where volatility has increased since the 1970s is 
agriculture. All three other sectors have 
experienced a decline in volatility. The service 
sector is by far the least volatile. This is not 
surprising, as the most cyclical components of 
final demand (inventories, investment and trade) 
                                                     
48  Investment seems to have been an important contributor 
to the reduced output volatility. This reduced volatility 
could be partly the result of reduced financial constraints 
as financial markets have become more integrated. See 
for instance Becker, B. and J. Sivadasan (2006), 'The 
effect of financial development on the investment-cash 
flow relationship: Cross country evidence from Europe', 
ECB Working Paper No 689.  
49  The euro-area aggregates were constructed as the sum of 
the gross value added of six euro-area Member States for 
which quarterly data were available since 1970 (Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain).  
 
Table 12: Standard deviations of y-o-y gross added value growth by sector (in %) (1) 
 1970Q1-1979Q4 1980Q1-1989Q4 1990Q1-1999Q4 1996Q4-2006Q3 
Difference           
1993Q4-2003Q3 vs. 
1990Q1-1999Q4 
Agriculture 3.53 3.13 3.26 6.25 2.72 
Industry 3.82 2.65 3.00 2.11 -1.71 
Construction 3.15 3.16 3.20 1.98 -1.17 
Services 1.43 0.85 0.89 0.87 -0.56 
(1) Gross value added estimates for the euro area are based on data of six euro-area countries. 
Source: Commission services. 
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play a comparatively much smaller role for 
services than for other sectors.50 
While the reduction in output volatility may be 
traced back to a decrease in volatility in 
individual sectors, sectoral shifts in production 
may also have played a role. Indeed, the share of 
services in the economy's total value added 
increased by about 12 percentage points between 
1970 and 2005. Given that services are less 
volatile than other sectors, this shift should have 
helped to reduce overall GDP volatility on top 
of the reduction in volatility observed in most 
sectors. One method of assessing the magnitude 
of this effect consists in calculating the volatility 
of GDP growth that would have been observed 
if the weight of each sector had been fixed at its 
1970 level. Performing a similar calculation with 
sectoral weights fixed at their 2005 level, and 
comparing the two estimates, will give an idea of 
the magnitude of changes in structures.  
For the euro area, these estimates suggest that 
the shift in shares from industry to services over 
the period between 1970 and 2005 can only 
explain about 10% of the drop in GDP volatility 
over that period. In other words, the 
contribution of the sectoral shift has been 
limited.  
Finally, it is worth noting that, although the shift 
towards services seems to have played only a 
minor role in the fall in output volatility at euro-
area level, the picture is rather different at 
Member State level. Indeed, using the same 
method, the shift in shares between 1970 and 
2005 can explain around 30% of the drop in 
volatility in Germany but only 3% in France.  
4.  Improved macroeconomic policies 
Most US studies have tended to downplay the 
contribution of macroeconomic policies to the 
moderation of volatility in that country. There is, 
however, reason to believe that macroeconomic 
policies have played a bigger role in the euro 
area. Changes in the macroeconomic framework 
and macroeconomic management have probably 
                                                     
50  See Focus 'The growing importance of services in the 
euro-area economy', Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 
Vol. 5, No 2 (2006). 
been more substantial in the euro area than in 
the US over the past three decades. 
Furthermore, a striking feature of the fall in the 
volatility of growth in the euro area is that it has 
been substantially more pronounced in countries 
such as Italy, Spain and Greece where 
macroeconomic management was probably 
comparatively less effective in the 1970s and part 
of the 1980s. Finally, although no empirical 
research is available for the euro area as a whole, 
there is some (limited) research on Germany also 
pointing in that direction. Applying spectral 
analysis, Buch, Doepke and Pierdzioch (2002) 
find that a non-negligible part of the change in 
output volatility in that country can be attributed 
to changes in economic policy.51 
What role for fiscal policy? 
There are reasons to believe that fiscal policy 
may have contributed significantly to the 
reduction in output growth volatility in the euro 
area over the past two decades by better 
smoothing fluctuations in activity. Increasing 
cyclical stabilisation may have come from 
improvements in the working of the two main 
channels of fiscal policy, namely automatic 
stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy.  
The size of automatic stabilisers may depend on 
the size of the government sector but also on 
the tax structure, the progressiveness of the tax 
system, the generosity of unemployment benefits 
and the sensitivity of unemployment to 
fluctuations in output. The larger the automatic 
stabilisers, the more cyclical fluctuations will be 
smoothened.  
There is some indirect empirical evidence of a 
link between government size and the 
smoothing power of automatic stabilisers. Fatás 
and Mihov (2001) report a strong negative 
correlation between government size and the 
volatility of GDP growth across OECD 
countries.52 The effect is not simply due to the 
fact that government expenditure tends to be 
                                                     
51  Buch, C. M., Doepke, J. and Pierdzioch, C. (2002), 
'Business cycle volatility in Germany', Kiel Working 
Paper No 1129. 
52 Fatás, A. and I. Mihov (2001), 'Government size and 
automatic stabilisers: international and intranational 
evidence', Journal of International Economics, 55 (2001), 
pp. 3-28 
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more stable than private expenditures as the 
negative relationship also holds when real GDP 
is replaced by private-sector output. After 
running a battery of cross-checks the authors 
conclude that the negative relation is probably 
related to the strength of automatic stabilisers.  
In contrast to the US, the size of the 
government in the euro area, measured by 
general government expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP increased the 1970s and 1980s. 
Therefore, there are reasons to believe that the 
size of the stabilisers has also increased, helping 
to better smooth cyclical fluctuations.  
Turning to the second channel, there is also 
evidence that improvements in the conduct of 
discretionary fiscal policy have contributed to 
the reduction in output growth volatility. In 
some Member States, the discretionary 
component of fiscal policies tended to be highly 
volatile in the 1970s and 1980s with periods of 
strong expansions followed by periods of sharp 
tightening (stop and go policies). More generally, 
budgetary policies in the euro area were then 
characterised by a relatively high degree of pro-
cyclicality and were therefore a source of cyclical 
amplification rather than cyclical stabilisation.  
There is, however, evidence that the conduct of 
budgetary policy has improved with EMU even 
if some elements of pro-cyclicality persist, most 
notably in good times. For instance, Gali and 
Perotti (2003) find that discretionary fiscal policy 
in euro-area countries has become more 
counter-cyclical since 1992.53 Graph 33 also 
clearly points in that direction. It shows whether 
fiscal policy in the euro area has been pro-
cyclical or counter-cyclical in good times 
(positive output gap) or bad times (negative 
output gap). For instance, in good times, fiscal 
policy is pro-cyclical if there is a decrease in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and 
counter- cyclical if there is an increase. The chart 
shows that, in the 1980s, discretionary fiscal 
policies were pro-cyclical both in good and bad 
times. Things have tended to improve in the 
1990s with some evidence of counter-cyclicality 
in good times but still substantial pro-cyclicality 
                                                     
53 Gali, J and R. Perotti (2003), 'Fiscal policy and monetary 
integration in Europe', Economic Policy, 18 (37), pp. 
533-572. 
in bad times. Since the launch of the euro 
budgetary policy has been counter-cyclical in bad 
times although elements of pro-cyclicality in 
good times remain.54 
Graph 33: Average fiscal stance in good and bad times, 
euro area (in % of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Overall, fiscal policy is likely to have contributed 
to the fall in output growth volatility in the euro 
area since the 1970s both because of a possible 
rise in the potency of automatic stabilisers and 
because of a lessening of the fiscal policy 
mistakes of the past. 
A more effective monetary policy  
Changes in the conduct of monetary policy are 
another possible source of decline in output 
volatility. Recent research on the US economy 
has generally downplayed the contribution of 
monetary policy to the decline in output growth 
in that country (see Box 4). For instance, Stock 
and Watson (2003) find that less than 10% of 
the moderation in volatility is attributable to 
improved monetary policy. For Gordon (2005) 
monetary policy also played a modest role. 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that 
these results are based on estimates of Taylor 
rules and thus capture only part of the changes 
in monetary policy over the past 35 years. For 
instance, changes in the credibility of monetary  
                                                     
54  European Commission (2006), Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, 'Public Finances in 
EMU', European Economy, No 3/2006. 
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Box 4: The decline in output growth volatility in the US 
 
It is now a well documented fact that output in the US has become noticeably less volatile in the last twenty years. 
Using different econometric techniques, most studies identify a structural break in US output volatility in 1984 
(McConnell, M. and G. Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson (2003) and Gordon (2005)). However, Blanchard 
and Simon (2001) argue that this decline, although it was temporarily halted during the 1970s, can be traced back at 
least to the 1950s.  
The existing literature offers different possible explanations for lower output volatility, but there is not real 
consensus on the causes of the observed decrease in US GDP volatility.   
Looking at GDP components, all empirical studies analysed here conclude that the fall in volatility was widespread 
throughout all demand components and not limited to a particular component. Blanchard and Simon (2001) and 
Stock and Watson (2003) find that the largest relative decline in volatility occurred in the cyclically sensitive housing 
sector. Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Gordon (2005) find evidence that inventories contributed to lower output 
volatility but this conclusion is disputed by Stock and Watson (2003). Concerning government spending, Gordon 
(2005) identified it as being by far the biggest contributor to lower volatility. Stock and Watson (2003) also find that 
federal government spending contributed to lower output volatility but it was certainly not the main driver. For 
instance, it contributed less than consumption. Blanchard and Simon (2001) also identify a sharp decrease in the 
volatility of government spending, but in the 1950s, after the Korean War.  
The role of the shift in the sectoral composition of output is also investigated in a number of papers. For Stock and 
Watson (2003), the shift away from manufacturing and towards services reduced the variance of GDP growth, but 
not by much. The estimated contribution of the sectoral shift is 8% for the US. This finding is consistent with 
Blanchard and Simon (2001). Compared to the other two papers, Gordon (2005) finds that a larger part (roughly 20 
percent) of the reduction in business-cycle volatility was due to shifts in shares toward more stable components 
(consumption of services) and away from more volatile components (consumption of non-durable goods).  
Another hypothesis is that the moderation of output volatility in the US may have been the result of improvements 
in the conduct of monetary policy. Blanchard and Simon (2001) find a strong relation between movements in output 
volatility and inflation volatility. Given that increased inflation stability is likely to be the result, in large part, of better 
monetary policy, the authors conclude that more effective monetary policy may have contributed to the reduction of 
business cycle volatility. Stock and Watson (2003) argue that although improved monetary policy played a key role in 
bringing inflation under control, it accounted for only a small fraction of the reduction in the volatility of output 
growth. They estimate that the Fed’s more aggressive response to inflation since the mid-1980s has contributed less 
than 10% to the decline in output volatility. For Gordon (2005) monetary policy also played only a modest role in 
the moderation of output volatility.  
Less frequent and smaller shocks have been put forward in the empirical literature on the decline in GDP volatility in 
the US as being one of the most important factors for the reduction in volatility. For Gordon (2005), for instance, 
the reduced variance of both demand and supply shocks was the dominant source of reduced business cycle volatility 
in the US. About two-thirds of the reduced volatility of the output gap is attributed to demand shocks, and the 
remainder to supply shocks. Stock and Watson (2003) conclude that most of the moderation is the result of an 
unusually quiet period, with soft macroeconomic shocks and no major supply disruption.  
Overall, there is not real consensus on the relative importance of each determinant in the observed decrease in US 
GDP volatility. However, it appears to be widespread throughout the US economy. Residential investment, 
government spending, improved inventory management, changes in production structures and better monetary 
policy have all contributed to the observed decline in US GDP volatility.  Nevertheless, most studies seem to concur 
in ascribing a large part of the decline to the reduced variance of macroeconomic shocks.  
References:  
Blanchard, O. and J. Simon (2001), 'The Long and Large Decline in US Output Volatility,' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 32 
(No 1), 135-64. 
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authorities and in inflationary expectations are 
not addressed by these models. This suggests 
that the conclusion of a modest contribution of 
monetary policy to the drop in output growth 
volatility in the US should be interpreted with 
prudence. 
In any event, although no empirical research is 
available on the issue, there are reasons to 
believe that monetary policy may have made a 
more substantial contribution to the fall in 
output growth volatility in the euro area than in 
the US: 
First, EMU has entailed a far-reaching change in 
the monetary regime in the euro area. In 
contrast, changes in the conduct of monetary 
policy have been much more limited the US.  
Second, it is important to note that there is a 
striking negative correlation between inflation 
levels and output growth volatility within the 
euro area. Those Member States which have 
experienced the largest fall in the level of 
inflation since the 1970s are also those which 
have experienced that largest fall in output 
volatility (Graph 34).  
Graph 34: Changes in output growth volatility and 
inflation levels, euro-area Member States  
(changes between 1970-79 and 1997-06 – in pp) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Overall, it is worth stressing that, since 1999, the 
ECB has been quite successful in stabilising 
inflation expectations. This is important since 
once long-run inflation expectations are 
anchored, monetary policy can act as a more 
effective tool for stabilising output. Indeed, 
stable inflation expectations eliminate an 
important source of macroeconomic instability, 
namely the possibility that shocks which affect 
inflation in the short term become amplified 
through a corresponding adjustment in inflation 
expectations.  
5. Shocks and good luck 
The final question to answer is whether the fall 
in output volatility is a permanent phenomenon 
or whether it was just the consequence of good 
luck in the form of reduced macroeconomic 
shocks. In the empirical literature, a number of 
authors have tried to answer that question by 
estimating small VAR or structural models and 
testing whether the observed decline in volatility 
is attributable to changes in the structure of the 
economy (i.e. changes in the estimated 
coefficients of the model) or to smaller shocks 
(i.e. smaller residuals in the equations). This 
research has generally concluded that most of 
the decline in output volatility since the 1970s is 
attributable to smaller shocks rather than 
changes in the structure of the economy. For 
instance, in the case of the US, Gordon finds 
that the reduced variance of both demand and 
supply shocks was the dominant source of 
reduced business cycle volatility. About two-
thirds of the reduced volatility of the output gap 
is attributed to demand shocks, and the 
remainder to supply shocks.55  
In the case of euro-area countries, based on a 
counterfactual VAR analysis, Buch, Doepke and 
Pierdzioch (2002) find evidence that smaller 
shocks have also, in the case of Germany, been 
behind the decline in output volatility.  
When assessing to what extent the reduction in 
volatility is attributable to good luck, the 
conclusions from these studies should, however, 
been interpreted with caution, for two reasons.  
First, the fact that shocks are estimated to have 
become smaller in parsimonious VAR or 
structural models does not tell us much about 
how lasting the reduction will be. Shocks being 
defined as error terms, they encapsulate 
everything that is not captured by the 
                                                     
55  This seems to corroborate our results on the reduced 
variances of inventories and investment as strong 
contributors to the decline in output volatility. 
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(parsimonious) model. Therefore, any 
improvement in economic structures or policies 
that is not explicitly captured in a model will be 
measured as a reduction in shocks.  For instance, 
improvements in inventory management or in 
the conduct of budgetary policies will be 
captured as a reduction in demand shocks. In 
other words, a reduction in the size of shocks in 
these small models is not necessarily the effect 
of temporary good luck but may be the result of 
changes in the structure of the economy or in 
macroeconomic policies.  
Second, the fact that the magnitude and 
frequency of shocks has decreased over the past 
two decades is somewhat at odds with our 
experience of evolving economic conditions. For 
instance, since the late 1990s, euro-area 
economies have been hit by a large number of 
shocks, including surging oil prices, the bursting 
of the ICT bubble and sharp gyrations in equity 
prices. However, the impact of these shocks on 
volatility seems to have been moderate. 
Overall, whereas good luck in the form of 
smaller shocks may have contributed to the 
reduction in volatility in the euro area, the 
analysis presented in the previous sections 
suggests that structural changes in the economy 
(better inventory management, increasing 
importance of services) and better 
macroeconomic management have probably 
played a key role. In other words, a large part of 
the decline in volatility in the euro area is likely 
to be of a durable nature rather than a reflection 
of temporary good luck. Further research would, 
however, be necessary to disentangle more 
clearly the respective contributions of shocks 
and structural or policy changes.  
6.  Conclusions 
The fall in output volatility in the euro area 
seems to share some similarities with 
developments in the US. On the demand side, 
less volatile inventories and housing investments 
in the euro area have played an important role in 
reducing output volatility. On the supply side, 
the reduction in output volatility appears to be 
widespread throughout the economy's main 
sectors. The progressive shift of the production 
structure from goods to services in the euro area 
only explains a fraction of the reduced volatility.  
At the same time, differences between the euro 
area and the US are also evident. The downward 
trend is less clear-cut in the euro area than in the 
US, due to heterogeneous developments at 
country level. Some euro-area countries 
experienced a sharp reduction in volatility during 
the 1970s and 1980s but little change over the 
last 15 years. Other countries were exposed to 
idiosyncratic shocks which momentarily 
interrupted the decline in volatility in the late 
1980s or early 1990s. Better economic policy has 
probably played a larger role in the euro area 
than in the US due to more comprehensive 
changes in the monetary and fiscal frameworks. 
Finally, in contrast to the US, the contribution of 
financial market integration is difficult to identify 
so far in aggregate euro-area macroeconomic 
data.  
Overall, although a reduction in the size of 
shocks may also have played a role, a large part 
of the decline in output growth volatility in the 
euro area seems to reflect structural changes and 
improved macroeconomic policy. 
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IV. Recent DG ECFIN publications  
1. Policy documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 4. 2006 
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EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 5. 2006 
Economic forecasts autumn 2006 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. No. 6. 2006 
The EU Economy 2006 Review 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/the_eu_economy_review20
06_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 27. November 2006 
Countries Country Study: Growth and competitiveness in the Polish economy: the road to real convergence 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers27_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. OCCASIONAL PAPERS. No. 28. February 2007 
Country Study: Raising Germany’s growth potential 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/occasionalpapers28_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT. No. 3. 2006 
Annual statement and report on the euro area 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/eespecialreport0306_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. SPECIAL REPORT. No. 4. 2006 
Labour market and wage development in 2005, with special focus on labour market adjustment in the euro 
area  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/eespecialreport0406_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGMENT PAPERS. No. 29. 2006 
Progress towards meeting the economic criteria for accession: the assessments of the 2006 Progress 
Reports  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp29_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ENLARGMENT PAPERS. No. 30. 2006 
Western Balkans in Transition 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/elp30_en.htm 
2. Analytical documents 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 264.  
Michael P. Devereux (Oxford University) and Peter Birch Sørensen (University of Copenhagen) 
The Corporate Income Tax: international trends and options for fundamental reform  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers264_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 265.  
Marcel Gérard (Catholic University of Mons) 
Reforming the taxation of multijurisdictional enterprises in Europe: a tentative appraisal 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers265_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 266.  
Marco Ratto, Werner Roeger, Jan in’t Veld (European Commission) 
Fiscal policy in an estimated open-economy model for the Euro area 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers266_en.htm  
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EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 267.  
Jonas Fischer, Lars Jonung, Martin Larch (European Commission) 
101 Proposals to reform the Stability and Growth Pact. Why so many? A Survey 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers267_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 268.  
Aino Salomäki (European Commission) 
Public pension expenditure in the EPC and the European Commission projections: an analysis of the 
projection results 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers268_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 269.  
Ruud A. de Mooij (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) and Gaëtan Nicodème (European 
Commission) 
Corporate tax policy, entrepreneurship and incorporation in the EU 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers269_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 270.  
Klas Fregert (Department of Economics University of Lund, Sweden) and Lars Jonung (Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Policy rule evaluation by contract-makers: 100 years of wage contract length in Sweden 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers270_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 271.  
Fabienne Ilzkovitz (European Commission, Université Libre de Bruxelles, ICHEC), Adriaan Dierx (European 
Commission), Viktoria Kovacs (European Commission), Nuno Sousa (European Commission) 
Steps towards a deeper economic integration: the internal market in the 21st century 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers271_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 272.  
Christian Dreger (DIW), Manuel Artís (AQR), Rosina Moreno (AQR), Raúl Ramos (AQR), Jordi Suriñach (AQR). 
Edited by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
Study on the feasibility of a tool to measure the macroeconomic impact of structural reforms 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers272_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 273.  
Luís Gordo Mora (Banco de España) and João Nogueira Martins (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs) 
How reliable are the statistics for the Stability and Growth Pact? 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers273_en.htm  
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
-    - 49
V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2003 2004 2005 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -11 -5 -8 4 5 6 6 5 5 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.5 2.0 1.3 -0.9 0.0 0.3 1.2 -0.2  
  2003 2004 2005 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch    0.6 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.9 
2 Private consumption 2003 2004 2005 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -18 -14 -14 -8 -8 -7 -6 -7 -5 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 0.1 0.2 1.0 -0.8 0.1 0.6 0.3 -1.0  
  2003 2004 2005 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 
3 Investment 2003 2004 2005 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 80.7 81.6 81.3 80.9 81.1 82.0 82.5 83.6 83.9 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch 1.0 2.1 2.7 1.3 0.4 0.8 2.1 0.6 1.2 
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP 0.0 -0.1  0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.2  
4 Labour market 2003 2004 2005 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.4 8.9 8.5 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.4  
   2003 2004 2005 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.6 
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 2.5 2.4  2.1 2.8 2.8 3.1 4.4 5.0 
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.5 2.2  2.2 2.1 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.5 
5 International transactions  2003 2004 2005 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -24 -13 -16 2 2 3 4 2 5 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 132 146 157 177 178 179 178 182  
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 1056.0 1142.1 1232.5 120.3 119.6 120.6 124.6   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 970.4 1069.1 1207.3 118.0 117.8 116.2 123.9   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR 85.6 73.0 25.2 2.3 1.8 4.4 0.7   
   2003 2004 2005 05Q3 05Q4 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 1.1 6.8 4.2 2.5 0.7 3.1 0.9 1.8 3.7 
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 3.1 6.7 5.2 2.0 1.5 2.3 0.8 2.2 1.9 
   2003 2004 2005 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 18.1 42.4 38.8 1.5 1.5 4.6 5.0   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -18.4 -39.7 -41.8 -27.1 -15.3 -13.0 -28.3   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR -9.4 39.0 32.3 44.2 22.5 45.5 39.6   
6 Prices  2003 2004 2005 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 1.6 2.3 4.1 4.6 4.0 4.3 4.1 2.9  
 Import prices6.4 Ann. % ch 102.5 97.2 104.8 113.5 111.2 110.9    
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2003 2004 2005 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 2.3 2.1 2.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.7 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 4.1 4.1 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.1 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  3.25 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.75 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 2420 2805 3207 109 113 115 116 118 119 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 7.8 5.9 7.4 8.4 8.8 9.3 9.8 9.8  
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 5.0 6.0 8.1 11.5 11.2 11.2 10.7 10.6  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 1.13 1.24 1.24 1.27 1.26 1.29 1.32 1.30 1.31 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 106.4 109.8 109.7 112.4 112.0 112.6 114.1 113.4 113.8 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area I/2007 
 
 
 
-    - 50
Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
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7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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